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ABSTRACT  
This study examines the impact of investment bank (IB) reputation on the long-term stock price 
performance of Chinese initial public offerings (IPOs) over the period 1993 to 2010. For comparison 
purposes, the whole sample period is separated into two sub-periods by the 2001 IPO allocation system 
reform: the quota system period from January 1st, 1993 to April 22nd, 2001 (hereafter, the pre-reform 
period) and the approval system period from April 23rd, 2001 to December 31st, 2010 (hereafter, the post-
reform period). Using two time-varying proxies for IB reputation, we find no impact of IB reputation on 
the three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) during the pre-reform period, but a significantly 
positive impact during the post-reform period. Our results are robust to various alternative methodological 
approaches in controlling for the problem of endogeneity and the cross-sectional correlations in abnormal 
returns.  
Keywords: Investment bank reputation; IPO long-term stock performance; IPO allocation system reform; 
China stock market 
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1. Introduction 
A growing body of theoretical and empirical research suggests that financial intermediaries improve 
information quality in capital markets, and in turn optimize resource allocation. Investment banks (IBs), as 
important financial intermediaries in the stock market, signal and certify issuer earnings quality during the 
initial public offering (IPO) process, helping mitigate information asymmetry between issuers and 
prospective investors (Booth & Smith, 1986; Carter & Manaster, 1990). A theoretical model developed by 
Chemmanur & Fulghieri (1994) implies that the more prestigious the IB, the more effective it will be in 
decreasing the influence of information asymmetry during the IPO process. Carter & Manaster (1990), 
Megginson & Weiss (1991), Carter, Dark, & Singh (1998), and others empirically examine various samples 
of IPOs issued in the 1980s and find a negative relationship between IB reputation and IPO initial returns. 
They attribute the lower level of IPO underpricing to the superior certification benefit provided by more 
prestigious IBs. The role of IBs reflects not only on their activity in the primary market, but on the entire 
array of activities in which they get involved. For example, prestigious IBs can enhance the long-term 
performance of IPOs through actively participating in aftermarket transactions (Michaely & Shaw, 1994; 
Carter et al., 1998). It is reasonable to presume that prestigious IBs usually benefit from their excellent 
network of brokers to distribute IPO shares and from their influential analyst coverage in the aftermarket 
(Carter et al., 1998; Jenkinson & Ljungqvist, 2001). For example, in examining 947 IPOs over the period 
1984 to 1988, Michaely & Shaw (1994) report that IPOs managed by more prestigious IBs significantly 
outperform their counterparts in the long term, in line with Carter et al. (1998) and Dong, Michel, & Panders 
(2011). 
Although the influence of IB reputation on IPO price performance has been well-documented in some 
developed markets,1 it may not be realistic to expect a similar effect in emerging markets where there exist 
more severe information asymmetry and much lower level of information efficiency (Harvey, 1995; Chan, 
Menkveld, & Yang, 2008). In such inefficient markets, it takes longer for any information to be fully 
incorporated into asset prices, which can cause the role of IBs in emerging markets to be distinct from that 
observed in developed markets. However, very little attention has been paid to the impact of IB reputation 
on IPO price performance in emerging markets. This study thus attempts to fill the gap by shedding new 
light on the China stock market, one of the largest and most important emerging markets in the world. In 
particular, its institutional setting has important characteristics that are different from and independent of 
those in developed markets, i.e., the dominance of individual investors, the long lag between the offering 
and listing dates, and the existence of a large number of non-trading shares, etc., which have been 
extensively criticized as an indicator of operating inefficiency (Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1996; Chan, 
                                                          
1 Empirical evidence shows that IBs help reduce information asymmetry in the US (Beatty & Ritter, 1986; Booth & Smith, 1986; 
Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994; Carter et al., 1998; Dunbar, 2000; Lee & Masulis, 2011), in the UK (Slovin, Sushka, & Lai, 2000), 
and in Japan (Cooney, Kao, & Schallheim, 2003).  
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Wang, & Wei, 2004). The China stock market, therefore, provides a unique arena to test whether the role 
of IB reputation helps improve informational efficiency and transparency in an emerging market context.2 
In addition, our particular attention to the China stock market is motivated by further consideration that the 
role of IBs during the IPO process has substantially changed following the IPO allocation system reform in 
2001. Specifically, a quota system was adopted in the China stock market before 2001, under which the 
aggregate quantity of equity to be issued each year is determined by the central government. The China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the regulatory authority of the China securities market on 
behalf of the central government, rather than IBs, was in charge of checking and supervising IPO firms’ 
credit, business risk, and offering size, etc., as well as determining the pricing and timing of IPOs. The 
quota system was replaced by a more market-oriented approval system in April 2001, under which the 
central government no longer placed a cap on the flow of funds raised or the number of IPOs issued in each 
year. Since then, Chinese IBs have been granted more freedom in pricing IPOs and taken more 
responsibility to evaluate issuers’ credit standing as well as risk and thereby to recommend qualified firms 
to the CSRC for the final offering approval. Such institutional reform in the China stock market makes it 
quite interesting to identify whether the enhanced role of IBs is helpful in improving the stock performance 
of IPOs in the long term. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first systematic and comprehensive study 
that comparatively examines the impact of IB reputation on the long-term stock performance of Chinese 
IPOs before and after the 2001 IPO allocation system reform. 
For comparison purposes, we separate the whole sample period into two sub-periods: the quota system 
period from January 1st, 1993 to April 22nd, 2001 (hereafter, the pre-reform period) and the approval 
system period from April 23rd, 2001 to December 31st, 2010 (hereafter, the post-reform period). Using a 
sample of 1,749 Chinese IPOs with the post-issue return evidence up to December 2013, we find some 
interesting evidence and make significant contributions to the finance literature in several aspects. 
Specifically, previous studies generally ignore the influence of IB reputation in explaining IPO price 
anomalies in emerging markets (Yong, 2007), mainly due to the non-existence of a transparent and 
convincing ranking system regarding IB reputation. We supplement the finance literature by constructing 
two novel proxies for IB reputation, based on a three-year moving average of the aggregate gross proceeds 
raised or the total number of IPOs managed by each IB in each calendar year. Unlike previous measures 
generally based on the simple assumption that IB reputation remains unchanged over the whole sample 
period (Carter & Manaster, 1990; Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Carter et al., 1998; Chen, Shi, & Xu, 2013), 
our proxies are thus dynamic and reflect changes in IB reputation over a long period of time, i.e., enormous 
takeovers of Chinese IBs occurring over the past two decades. In particular, we provide a complete list of 
165 Chinese IBs that got involved in at least one IPO over the period 1993 to 2010, based on both proxies 
                                                          
2 More institutional features of the China stock market are as discussed in Wang, Wong, & Xia (2008), Su and Bangassa (2011), 
and Su and Brookfield (2013), among others. 
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for IB reputation, as well as a list of major takeovers of Chinese IBs occurring throughout the whole sample 
period (see Appendices I & II). 
We find that IB reputation has no significant impact on the long-term stock performance of IPOs during 
the pre-reform period, but a significantly positive impact during the post-reform period. Specifically, during 
each allocation system period, all IPOs are sorted into three reputation groups: Low, Medium, or High, 
according to whether the value of IB reputation is included within the lowest 30, middle 40, or highest 30 
percentile, respectively. We find that the difference in mean three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHARs) of IPOs between Low and High reputation groups (0.573%) is statistically insignificant (t-stat = 
1.24; Kruskal–Wallis χ2 = 1.64), during the pre-reform period. However, during the post-reform period, the 
mean three-year BHAR of IPOs in High reputation group (12.023%) is significantly higher than that of 
IPOs in Low reputation group (0.556%) at the 1% level (t-stat = 3.43; Kruskal–Wallis χ2 = 19.25). Our 
results are robust to several alternative methodological approaches, i.e., the standard two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) estimation and the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure, in controlling for the problem of 
endogeneity, as well as the calendar-time portfolio approach in correcting for the cross-sectional 
correlations in the event-time BHARs. The differential relationship between IB reputation and IPO long-
term stock performance during the pre- and post-reform periods not only provides additional empirical 
evidence in an emerging market context, but has important relevance to both financial regulators and market 
participants, in particular, to international practitioners, such as the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors 
(QFIIs),3 who now have great interests in investing firms listed on the China stock market.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following section presents institutional 
background, related literature, and hypothesis development. Section 3 describes data and methodological 
approaches, while empirical results are presented in Section 4. The final section concludes this study.  
2. Institutional Background, Related Literature, and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. 2001 IPO Allocation System Reform 
The China stock market has experienced tremendous development since the launch of the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SHSE) in 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in 1991. The total number of listed 
firms was 2,489 by the end of 2013, including 953 on the SHSE and 1,536 on the SZSE.4 Such rapid growth 
has created substantial demand for investment banking services, but the central government remains in tight 
control of the financial services industry, particularly under the quota system in effect before April 2001. 
Specifically, the central government determined the aggregate quantity of equity to be issued each year to 
maintain control over the size and stability of the China stock market (Fang, 1995), and then allocated 
                                                          
3 In November 2002, the CSRC and the People’s Bank of China (PBOC; the central bank of China) introduced the QFII program 
as a way for foreign capital to access the China capital market. By the end of 2013, 228 foreign institutions had been granted the 
QFII licenses and approved with a total investment quota of USD 49.701 billion, according to the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE). 
4 The total market capitalization of A-shares and B-shares was RMB 15.117 trillion in the SHSE and RMB 8.791 trillion in the 
SZSE by the end of 2013; the total number of investors was 114.442 million in the SHSE and 110.856 million in the SZSE by the 
end of 2013. The data are collected from the official websites of the SHSE and SZSE. 
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among regional governments according to their needs. Regional governments often cut down the issuing 
proceeds for each issuer so that more firms could go public and yet keep the region within its quota limit. 
In 1996, the quota was modified from restriction on the amount of equity to be issued to restriction on the 
number of firms to be listed. The quota system made IPO qualification a scarce resource, inevitably leading 
to fierce regional competition for the allocation of quotas. Such competition had developed great interests 
for regional officials in their regions’ economic performance, which became a critical factor for their own 
career advancement (Maskin, Qian, & Xu, 2000). That is, gaining more quotas for their regions and being 
able to fulfill them were viewed as signs of regional officials’ political achievement; failure to meet the 
current year’s quota resulted in the reduction of future quota, which had an adverse effect on regional 
officials’ political reputation (Li & Zhou, 2005). Therefore, to maximize the quota allocation and to avoid 
negative political implications of a failed IPO, regional governments might either directly assist IPO 
candidates in earnings manipulation through financial subsidies, or assign underwriting tasks to their 
acquiescent IBs that are more willing to cover up for them (Aharony, Lee, & Wong, 2000; Wang et al., 
2008). Under the quota system, the CSRC, rather than IBs, was in charge of examining and supervising the 
issuers’ credit, business risk, and offering size, etc., as well as determining the pricing and timing of IPOs, 
and IBs were subject to accountability and immune from punishments related to the poor quality of issuers. 
As a result, the listing of poor quality firms could seriously harm investor interests and impede market 
development.  
To promote a more market-oriented and internationalized IPO allocation system, the CSRC released 
Circular on Promulgation of Procedures for Public Offering Review of the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (Ref: No. 16 [2000]) on March 16th, 2000 and Standards for Contents and Formats of 
Information Disclosure by Companies Publicly Offering Securities No. 1: Prospectuses (Ref: No. 41 [2001]) 
on March 16th, 2001, marking the implementation of a new approval system in replace of the old quota 
system in the China stock market. The central government no longer put a cap on the flow of funds raised 
or the number of IPOs issued in each year and, since then, part of the approval authority used to be an 
exclusive responsibility of the CSRC has been shifted to IBs. For example, IBs have been taking on more 
responsibility to evaluate issuers’ credit standing and to recommend qualified firms for final verification as 
long as the firm meets all relevant listing standards set by the CSRC and requirements stipulated by the 
Securities Law and the Company Law, although the CSRC as the legally authorized approval authority still 
has the final right to approve or veto listing applications. In this way, IBs are motivated to improve the 
quality management of issuers and intensify their risk controls. Specifically, the CSRC stipulates that the 
leading IB should supervise the issuer for one year prior to the IPO, including giving advice on the issuer’s 
corporate governance, corporate structure, financial system, and the like, and should be responsible for the 
truthfulness of disclosure. In addition, the IB’s responsibility in regard to the issuer lasts for two years after 
going public, in case the issuer’s financial performance deteriorates significantly during that period. This 
gradual improvement in the overall regulatory environment and in the independence of IBs is intended to 
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restrict the extent of earnings manipulation as it makes more difficult for regional governments to collude 
with issuers residing in their jurisdictions.  
2.2. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
Two important aspects of firms that engage in IPOs have been well documented in the finance literature: 
initial underpricing and the subsequent long-term underperformance as measured by their abnormal returns. 
Unlike the consistent evidence on underpricing in various markets around the world, empirical evidence on 
the long-term stock performance of IPOs remains controversial (Loughran, Ritter, & Rydqvist, 1994; Ritter 
& Welch, 2002; Yong, 2007). Although there is no widely accepted theory for IPO long-term performance, 
previous studies suggest that information asymmetry offers a reasonable explanation (Brav & Gompers, 
1997; Jenkinson & Ljungqvist, 2001; Levis, 2011). It is expected that under information asymmetry, the 
existing shareholders and managers have information advantages over investors in regard to the issuer 
(Loughran et al., 1994), as investors rely primarily on financial statements in the offering prospectuses, 
which are supposed to be presented in a favorable manner. That is, issuers might boost earnings relative to 
cash flows before the IPO and the profitability declines after the IPO (Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998). Given 
information asymmetry, investors cannot effectively identify the quality of issuers, leading to an adverse 
selection problem, and eventually a lemon market (Beatty & Ritter, 1986; Rock, 1986).  
In order to solve information asymmetry in the new issue market, it is essential to introduce a trustworthy 
third party to deliver valuable information to investors (Baron, 1982). IBs, as financial intermediaries in 
the IPO market, play an important certification role as information producers to reduce information 
asymmetry between insiders and prospective investors. Booth & Smith (1986) consider IBs to be an integral 
part of the capital raising decision. They argue that issuers can send efficient signal to investors through the 
process of choosing IBs, since prestigious IBs carefully consider the quality of issuers and their own 
reputation before they decide to manage the IPO. Also, prestigious IBs usually hire high quality auditors to 
prevent aggressive earnings management; as a result, they can provide reliable certification of their clients 
(Aharony, Lin, & Loeb, 1993; Klein, 2002; Jo, Kim, & Park, 2007). If investors fail to understand the 
certification role of IBs, they will overpay (both at the offering price and in the immediate aftermarket) for 
IPOs lacking in certification from prestigious IB(s), thereby causing the underperformance in the long term 
(Dong et al., 2011).  
Furthermore, prestigious IBs can enhance the long-term stock performance of IPOs through actively 
participating in aftermarket transactions. It is reasonable to presume that prestigious IBs usually benefit 
from their excellent network of brokers to distribute shares and from their influential analyst coverage in 
the aftermarket to reduce information asymmetry (Baron, 1982; Carter et al., 1998; Jenkinson & Ljungqvist, 
2001; Loughran & Ritter, 2004). Also, Beatty & Ritter (1986) argue that in order to attract more investors 
to subscribe new issues, more prestigious IBs tend to introduce less risky firms to the market. For example, 
in examining 947 IPOs over the period 1984 to 1988, Michaely & Shaw (1994) report that IPOs managed 
by more prestigious IBs significantly outperform their counterparts in the long term. Consistent with this, 
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Carter et al. (1998) find less negative three-year BHARs of IPOs managed by more prestigious IBs, based 
on a sample of 2,292 IPOs from 1979 to 1991. Also, Dong et al. (2011) find consistent evidence and argue 
that IBs play an active marketing role in IPO promotion, price stabilization, and analyst coverage, etc., 
thereby helping improve the long-term performance of IPOs.  
IBs, as repetitive players in the stock market, obtain and accumulate their reputation capital, which is 
directly affected by the accounting and aftermarket stock performance through their previous underwritings 
(Dunbar, 2000; Fang 2005). If investors and/or issuers feel that they are misled by an IB in a previous IPO 
investment, it will become much more costly for the IB to market future new issues and result in a reduction 
in the likelihood that the IB is employed by the issuer in subsequent seasoned offerings (James, 1992; Brav 
& Gompers, 1997). Prestigious IBs, therefore, invariably attempt to protect their reputation capital by 
reducing the probability of becoming involved with poor quality issuers. According to the above 
discussions and accounting for the changing role of IBs after the 2001 IPO allocation system reform in the 
China stock market, we test the following two main hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: IB reputation has no impact on the long-term stock performance of IPOs during the pre-
reform period; 
Hypothesis 2: IB reputation has a significantly positive impact on the long-term stock performance of IPOs 
during the post-reform period. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Sample Selection and Description 
Our sample consists of 1,749 IPOs issued either on the SHSE or SZSE over the period January 1993 to 
December 2010. To be included in our sample, IPOs have to meet the following criteria: i) the IPO has an 
offering price of at least RMB 2.00 per share; ii) the IPO is underwritten by IBs; iii) the IPO does not result 
from a takeover or a major restructuring scheme; and iv) the IPO is with available financial data. We also 
exclude all financial firms due to their highly regulated nature, according to the two-digit Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) codes 83–87 (see Appendix III). Data on the offering price, first trading 
day closing price, gross proceeds, number of state-owned shares, total shares outstanding, offering and 
listing dates, and founding date of each IPO firm are collected from the China Stock Market & Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database via Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). We double-check the data for 
accuracy using the official websites of both stock exchanges, as well as the listing prospectuses of all IPO 
firms. Other data, such as the total monthly price return index of each IPO firm, as well as the SHSE and 
SZSE A-Share Indices, are collected from DataStream. The total monthly price return index has been 
adjusted for stock dividends, stock splits, and/or rights offerings.  
<Table 1> 
Table 1 shows the distribution of IPOs by the year of issuing over the sample period, in terms of the number 
of IPOs and raised aggregate gross proceeds. The gross proceeds are adjusted using the annual Consumer 
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Price Index (CPI; 2005 = 100), released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China. Panel A shows 
that the mean gross proceeds raised by 963 IPOs issued during the post-reform period, RMB 1,050.32 
million (USD 130.13 million), are significantly higher than those raised by 786 IPOs issued during the pre-
reform period, RMB 395.02 million (USD 48.94 million), at the 1% level (t-stat = 5.47; Kruskal–Wallis χ2 
= 46.65), which could be due to a number of giant state-owned enterprises (SOEs), e.g., oil firms, banks, 
and insurance firms that went public on the SHSE after 2000. Furthermore, in 2000, the CSRC began 
preparations to set up a small and medium enterprise (SME) Board on the SZSE, resulting in a three-year 
suspension of IPOs on the SZSE from 2001 to 2003. The SZSE launched the SME Board on May 27th, 
2004, followed by a separate Growth Enterprise Board (a NASDAQ-type exchange, also known as the 
ChiNext Board), inaugurated on October 23rd, 2009, to promote more high-growth and high-tech firms. 
The mean gross proceeds raised by the 678 IPOs on the SME and ChiNext Boards over the sample period 
are RMB 593.56 million (USD 73.54 million). Thus, it is not surprising that the mean gross proceeds raised 
by 1,042 IPOs on the SZSE, RMB 509.52 million (USD 63.13 million), are significantly less than those 
raised by 707 IPOs on the SHSE, RMB 1,118.85 million (USD 138.62 million) at the 1% level (t-stat = 
3.76; Kruskal–Wallis χ2 = 42.64).  
3.2. Measure of IB Reputation 
Given that the most popular Carter & Manaster (1990) measure based on tombstone announcements is 
inapplicable outside the US, we develop two proxies for IB reputation. The main proxy for IB reputation 
(IBRMAIN) assumes that more prestigious IBs tend to have greater market share in terms of the raised gross 
proceeds, while the alternative proxy (IBRALT) assumes that IBs having successfully managed more IPOs 
are much better known by market participants and therefore have better reputation (Megginson & Weiss, 
1991). Importantly, we take into consideration the view that IB reputation is built on observable past 
performance. That is, an IB that performs well during previous periods is expected to have an enhanced 
and measurable reputation in subsequent periods. In a departure from and an extension of usual assumption 
made in previous work that IB reputation remains unchanged over the whole sample period (Carter & 
Manaster, 1990; Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Carter et al., 1998; Chen et al., 2013), we account for numerous 
takeovers of Chinese IBs occurring over the past two decades, in attempts to capture the dynamic change 
in IB reputation over time.  
Specifically, for a set of IBs I in each calendar year t, we first define reputation ranking of IB i, IBRMAINi,t, 
on a continuous variable of [0, 10]: 10 × [ln 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖∈𝐼
(ln 𝑥𝑖,𝑡)⁄ ], where xi,t represents the raised aggregate 
gross proceeds by IB i in year t. Therefore, the IB with the highest aggregate gross proceeds raised in year 
t has a reputation ranking of 10, while an IB without managing any IPO in year t has a reputation ranking 
of 0. The three-year moving average (t –3, t –2, t –1) reputation ranking of IB i in year t is computed as: 
𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑖,𝑡 = (𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑖,𝑡−3 + 𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) 3⁄ . The alternative proxy for IB reputation, 
IBRALTi,t, is calculated based on the three-year moving average (t –3, t –2, t –1) of the total number of IPOs 
managed by IB i in each calendar year t: 𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑁𝑖,𝑡−3 + 𝑁𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) 3⁄ .  If an IPO is co-
 
 
8 
managed by two or more IBs, we split the raised aggregate gross proceeds and the total number of IPOs 
equally among them. To assist future research into the influence of IB reputation on IPO price anomalies 
in the China new issue market, we provide a complete list of 165 Chinese IBs that were involved in at least 
one IPO over the period 1993 to 2010, based on both proxies for IB reputation, as well as a list of major 
takeovers of Chinese IBs occurring throughout the whole sample period (see Appendices I & II). 
3.3. Measure of IPO Long-Term Stock Performance 
Various event-time and calendar-time approaches to measuring the long-term stock performance are 
vigorously debated in the literature, though there is no consensus as to the optimal methodological approach 
(Lyon, Barber, & Tsai, 1999; Brav, Geczy, & Gompers, 2000; Mitchell & Stafford, 2000; Schultz, 2003). 
Two alternative benchmarks are employed in this study: i) a reference portfolio benchmark based on the 
existing listed firms classified with similar size and book-to-market ratio (B/M) as well as within the same 
industry category, according to the two-digit ICB codes, for the event-time approach (see Appendix III for 
details on the construction of the reference portfolio benchmark);5 and ii) the intercepts derived from two 
multi-factor asset pricing models, i.e., the Fama & French (1993) three-factor model and the Carhart (1997) 
four-factor model, for the calendar-time approach.  
3.3.1. Event-Time Approach 
The average annual number of trading days in the China stock market is 244 over the sample period, with 
an average of 20 trading days per month. Hence, an event month is defined as a successive 20-trading-day 
interval following the first trading day. The long-term stock performance of IPOs is measured by the 
reference portfolio-adjusted BHARs over a period of 36 months after listing, excluding the initial returns.  
Following the calculations proposed by Loughran & Ritter (1995), we define the reference portfolio-
adjusted BHARi,T on the IPO i for a holding period of T months as: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇 = 𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑇 − 𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑝,𝑇 = [∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡) −  1
𝑇
𝑡=1 ] − [∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑝,𝑡) −  1
𝑇
𝑡=1 ],  (1) 
where Ri,t and Rp,t represent the monthly returns on IPO i and its reference portfolio p, respectively, in event 
month t following listing; BHRi,T and BHRp,T represent the buy-and-hold returns on IPO i and its reference 
portfolio p, respectively, for a holding period of T months. 
The equal-weighted reference portfolio-adjusted 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑇 on N IPOs for a holding period of T months is 
computed as: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑇 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇
𝑁
𝑖=1 . (2) 
                                                          
5 Although matching firms might be the most appropriate benchmark to measuring the long-term abnormal returns (Barber & Lyon, 
1997), it is always a big challenge to find appropriate matching firms for Chinese IPO firms, in particular, for those giant SOEs 
issued after 2000. Lyon et al. (1999) point out that a reference portfolio is able to capture normal or expected return and to address 
the new listing and rebalancing biases. Perry & William (1994) claim that firms classified under the same industry and with similar 
size and B/M are subject to similar economic and competitive factors and thus have comparable operating, investing, and financing 
opportunity sets. 
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The bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic (tsa) is used to evaluate the significance of 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑇: 
𝑡𝑠𝑎(𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑇) = √𝑁 (𝑆 +  
1
3
𝛾𝑆2 +  
1
6𝑁
𝛾),  (3) 
where 𝑆 =  
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑇
𝜎(𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑇)
 and 𝛾 =  
∑ (𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇−𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑇)
3𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁𝜎(𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑇)3
,  where 𝛾  is the estimation of the coefficient of 
skewness.  
3.3.2. Calendar-Time Approach 
To eliminate potential cross-sectional correlations in abnormal returns in the event-time approach and to 
achieve more robust statistical tests, we use two alternative calendar-time approaches to measure the long-
term abnormal performance of IPOs. First, we compute the mean monthly abnormal returns for a diversified 
portfolio including IPOs issued within the last three years, relative to the reference portfolio benchmark. 
Second, two multi-factor asset pricing models are estimated to discover significant patterns in the time-
series long-term stock returns. The Fama & French (1993) three-factor model is: 
𝑅𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,  (4) 
where Rp,t represents the IPO portfolio return in month t; (Rm,t – Rf,t) represents the value-weighted return 
on the SHSE and SZSE A-Share Indices in month t, in excess of the risk-free rate;6 SMBt represents the 
difference in monthly returns between portfolios of big and small-sized stocks; HMLt represents the 
difference in monthly returns between portfolios of high and low B/M stocks;7 and ɛi,t represents the error 
term.  
Carhart (1997) incorporates a momentum factor into the Fama & French (1993) three-factor model to 
capture the medium-term return continuation documented by Jegadeesh & Titman (1993). The Carhart 
(1997) four-factor model is: 
𝑅𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖𝑊𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,  (5) 
where WMLt represents the difference in monthly returns between portfolios of past winner and loser stocks; 
other variables are as defined in Eq. (4); ɛi,t represents the error term. 
A significantly positive or negative intercept term from the regression, therefore, indicates the presence of 
the long-term over- or underperformance of IPOs after controlling for the market, size, value, and 
momentum factors. 
3.4. Cross-Sectional Regression Model 
We estimate the cross-sectional OLS regressions to formally examine the impact of IB reputation on the 
long-term stock performance of IPOs. Like Carter et al. (1998), we first transform the equal-weighted 
                                                          
6 We use the three-month household deposit interest rate in China as the risk-free rate in this study as the three-month Chinese T-
Bill, which started in 2001, does not have a sufficiently long history for our analysis. 
7 We construct portfolios that mimic the size, value, and momentum factors in the China stock market, strictly following Fama & 
French (1993) and Carhart (1997). 
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reference portfolio-adjusted three-year BHARs to the natural logarithm of 1,000% plus each BHAR 
(LNBHAR36).8 The transformed dependent variable LNBHAR36 is regressed on the main and alternative 
proxies for IB reputation, separately, and on six control variables generally employed in previous studies 
to proxy for apparent risk of IPOs. We also include two indicator variables for years and industries, 
according the two-digit ICB codes, to control for the potential year and industry fixed effects, respectively. 
The OLS regression model is: 
𝐿𝑁𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅36 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1(𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁  𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑇) + 𝛼2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌
+ 𝜀, 
(6) 
where the dependent variable, two IB reputation variables, and all control variables are as defined in 
Appendix IV; ε represents the error term. 
<Table 2> 
Table 2 sets out descriptive statistics (in Panel A) and Pearson correlation coefficients (in Panel B) for all 
variables in Eq. (6) during the pre- and post-reform periods. For example, Panel A shows a significantly 
negative reference portfolio-adjusted mean BHAR of –4.440% during the pre-reform period and a 
significantly positive mean three-year BHAR of 6.430% during the post-reform period, while the median 
values give an opposite result, i.e., the median three-year BHARs of –0.008% and –8.768% during the pre- 
and post-reform periods, respectively. In addition, more prestigious IBs tend to manage the large-sized and 
less risky and/or more established IPO firms, which are subject to relatively less uncertainty (Beatty & 
Ritter, 1986). In particular, IPOs issued during the post-reform period show some distinct characteristics, 
i.e. a smaller fraction of state-owned shares and a shorter lag between the offering and listing dates. A 
unique characteristic of the China stock market is the existence of a majority of non-tradable state-owned 
shares for public listed firms, making agency costs and illiquidity high (Boycko et al., 1996; Chen et al., 
2006). The fraction of state-owned shares is reduced from 46.649% to 18.219% after the 2001 IPO 
allocation system reform. Another important characteristic is the longer time lag between the offering and 
listing dates compared with a relatively short time lag in developed markets. The average time lag during 
the pre-reform period is of 59.280 days, which is reduced to 14.025 days during the post-reform period. 
Generally, the long delay increases the uncertainty of the issuer and results in potential risk for subscribers 
of IPO shares. In addition, both proxies for IB reputation are highly correlated.  
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Univariate Analysis Results 
Table 3 presents the equal-weighted reference portfolio-adjusted BHARs of IPOs for up to 36 months after 
listing. The left side of Table 3 shows that IPO firms underperform their reference portfolio benchmark in 
                                                          
8 A Shaporp–Wilk test shows that the distribution of the equally-weighted reference portfolio-adjusted three-year BHARs over the 
period 1993 to 2010 is not normally distributed at the 5% level (p-value = 0.029), while the transformed dependent variable 
LNBHAR36 is normally distributed over the sample period (p-value = 0.337). 
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the long term during the pre-reform period. Specifically, we find a significantly negative two-year BHAR 
of –3.061% (t-stat = –2.29) at the 5% level and a significantly negative three-year BHAR of –4.440% (t-
stat = –2.59) at the 1% level. However, during the post-reform period, IPO firms outperform their reference 
portfolio benchmark in the long term, showing a significantly positive two-year BHAR of 4.326% (t-stat = 
2.01) at the 5% level and a significantly positive three-year BHAR of 6.430% (t-stat = 2.75) at the 1% 
level.9 
<Table 3> 
Table 4 presents the univariate analysis results of the reference portfolio-adjusted three-year BHARs of 
IPOs during the pre- and post-reform periods. All IPOs are sorted into three reputation groups: Low, 
Medium, or High, according to whether the value of IBRMAIN (in Panel A) or IBRALT (in Panel B) is included 
in the lowest 30, middle 40, or highest 30 percentile, respectively. Panel A shows that mean three-year 
BHARs in each reputation group: –4.127%, –4.479%, and –4.700% for IPOs within the Low, Medium, and 
High reputation groups, respectively, is very close to that of the whole sample, –4.440%, during the pre-
reform period. The parametric and non-parametric tests for the difference in mean BHARs between Low 
and High reputation groups is statistically insignificant (t-stat = 1.24; Kruskal–Wallis χ2 = 1.64), implying 
that IB reputation has no impact on the long-term stock performance of IPOs during the pre-reform period. 
<Table 4> 
However, during the post-reform period, we find a monotonically positive relationship between the long-
term performance of IPOs and IB reputation in the three reputation groups. Specifically, Panel A shows 
that IPOs within the Low, Medium, and High reputation groups generate mean three-year BHARs of –
0.556%, 7.476%, and 12.023%, respectively. Also, the mean BHAR of IPOs in High reputation group is 
significantly higher than that of IPOs in Low reputation group at the 1% level (t-stat = 3.43; Kruskal–Wallis 
χ2 = 19.25).10 The results presented in Panel B of Table 4 are qualitatively the same, strongly supporting 
our Hypotheses 1 and 2 that IB reputation has no impact on the long-term stock performance of IPOs during 
the pre-reform period, but significantly positive impact during the post-reform period. 
<Figures 1a & 1b> 
We further compare the three-year BHARs between IPOs managed by more and less prestigious IBs, in 
terms of the year of issuing, to rule out the concern that our results presented in Table 4 might be due to the 
extreme performance in a specific year. We segment all IPOs into High and Low reputation groups, 
according to the median value of IBRMAIN (in Figure 1a) or IBRALT (in Figure 1b). Both Figures illustrate 
                                                          
9 Our out-of-sample evidence in the China stock market context supports Fama’s (1998) viewpoint that the controversy over mixed 
results concerning the long-term performance of IPOs is not simply sample and market specific. We do not discuss the matter in 
further detail, as the main purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of IB reputation on the long-term stock performance of 
IPOs, rather than adding another piece of evidence to the vast literature on IPO price anomalies. 
10 We also employ the non-parametric test for the difference in median BHARs between Low and High reputation groups, showing 
statistically insignificant (Kruskal–Wallis χ2 = 1.43) during the pre-reform period, but significant at the 1% level (Kruskal–Wallis 
χ2 = 15.40) during the post-reform period. 
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consistent evidence in each year of issuing that there is no significant difference of the three-year BHARs 
between Low and High reputation groups during the pre-reform period, while during the post-reform period, 
IPOs in High reputation group generate much higher three-year BHARs than those in Low reputation 
group.11  
4.2. Regional Analysis Results 
Although the quota system is generally supposed to lead to rent-seeking activities and inefficient resource 
allocation (Aharony et al., 2000; Wang et al., 2008), Maskin et al. (2000) argue that regional governments 
have enough incentives to increase their political reputation with successful IPOs. They co-operate with 
their acquiescent IBs located in the same regions and select better quality IPO firms to enhance their 
regions’ future access to quotas. During the pre-reform period, 254 out of 786 IPO firms (32.32%) in our 
sample choose their IBs located in the same regions. Tables 5 present the regional analysis results of the 
reference portfolio-adjusted three-year BHARs of IPOs during the pre- and post-reform periods, but we 
focus on discussing the results during the pre-reform period, as the results during the post-reform period 
are highly consistent with those shown in Table 4.12 
<Table 5> 
During the pre- and post-reform periods, we divide all IPOs into two region groups, according to whether 
the IPO firm and its IB(s) are located in the same or different regions. Panel A of Table 5 shows that, during 
the pre-reform period, the 254 IPOs managed by IBs in the same regions generate a mean three-year BHARs 
of –1.193%, much higher than that of –5.990% generated by other IPOs managed by IBs in the different 
regions. IPOs in each region group are also sorted into two reputation groups: Low or High, based on the 
median value of IBRMAIN (in Panel A) or IBRALT (in Panel B). Interestingly, Panel A shows that in the same 
region group, the mean BHAR of IPOs managed by more prestigious IBs is significantly higher than that 
of IPOs managed by less prestigious IBs at the 10% level (t-stat = 1.90; Kruskal–Wallis χ2 = 2.86), while 
the results are insignificant in the different region group. Our results are qualitatively the same in Panel B 
of Table 5, using IBRALT as the alternative measure of IB reputation.  
Further analyses show that the better long-term stock performance of IPOs in the same region group during 
the pre-reform period is driven by 108 IPO firms located in three economically advanced regions, Shanghai, 
Shenzhen, and Guangdong. IBs from the three regions dominate the underwriting of their local IPOs: 
82.35% for Shanghai (42 out of 51), 91.43% for Shenzhen (32 out of 35), and 79.07% for Guangdong (34 
out of 43). Specifically, during the pre-reform period, the 108 IPOs generate a positive mean three-year 
BHAR of 5.441%, relative to a negative mean three-year BHAR of –6.106% generated by other 146 IPOs 
                                                          
11 We notice that the results for 2006–2008 in Figure 1a and 1b are relatively extreme, which could be attributed to the booming 
market over the period 2006 to 2008. For example, after a long-term downward trend from 2001 to 2005 (the SHSE Composite 
Index plunged from a record high of 2,245 points on June 14th, 2001 to 998 points on June 6th, 2005), the China stock market 
experienced a dramatic rebound from 2006 to 2007 until the 2008 global financial crisis (the SHSE Composite Index reached a 
new record high of 6,124 points on October 16th, 2007).  
12 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the regional analyses. The details on the regional locations of IPO firms and 
IBs are not tabulated for the sake of brevity, but available on request. 
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managed by IBs in the different regions. These results are not tabulated for the sake of brevity, but available 
on request. 
4.3. Multivariate Analysis Results 
To confirm the univariate analysis results, we estimate the OLS regression model of Eq. (6) on the reference 
portfolio-adjusted three-year BHARs using the main or alternative proxy for IB reputation (IBRMAIN or 
IBRALT), along with other control variables. As expected, Panel A of Table 6 shows statistically insignificant 
coefficients on IBRMAIN (t-stat = 0.15) in Regression (1) and on IBRALT (t-stat = 0.88) in Regression (2) 
during the pre-reform period, but significantly positive coefficients on IBRMAIN (t-stat = 2.90) in Regression 
(3) and on IBRALT (t-stat = 3.04) in Regression (4) at the 1% level, during the post-reform period. 
Furthermore, during the post-reform period, the coefficient of IBRMAIN (IBRALT) suggests that an increase of 
1 on IB reputation, on average, gives rise to an additional increase of 5.5% (6.1%) on the mean three-year 
BHAR, showing strongly economic importance. The untabulated z-statistics also indicate that both 
coefficients on IBRMAIN between Regressions (1) and (3) and coefficients on IBRALT between Regressions 
(2) and (4) are statistically different at the 1% level (p-value < 0.001).13 Overall, the OLS regression results 
are consistent with the univariate analysis results shown in Table 4 and again support Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
<Table 6> 
All regression results presented in Panel A of Table 6 are based on the whole sample of 1,749 IPOs on the 
SHSE and SZSE. However, the SZSE has been specially designed for young and high-tech-related small 
and medium-sized firms since the launch of the SME Board in May 2004 and the ChiNext Board in October 
2009, whereas the SHSE attracts large-sized and more established firms. Thus, each stock exchange has a 
different risk profile that may affect the long-term stock performance of IPOs. We repeat all tests in Panel 
A of Table 6 exclusively using a sub-sample of 707 IPOs on the SHSE. The regression results presented in 
Panel B are qualitatively the same.14  
4.4. Controlling for the Problem of Endogeneity 
Much of the existing theoretical and empirical literature presents a potential self-selection bias, that is, the 
matching between issuers and IBs is not random (Beatty & Welch, 1996; Carter & Manaster, 1990; 
Fernando, Gatchev, & Spindt, 2005) as prestigious IBs tend to underwrite high quality issuers to preserve 
their reputation capital. If the characteristics of issuers that affect this choice are related to the long-term 
stock performance of IPOs, then the proxy for IB reputation and the error term will be correlated in the 
OLS regression, that is, the coefficients on IBRMAIN and IBRALT in Regressions (1–8) will be biased. To 
                                                          
13 z-statistics are employed to test statistical differences between two coefficients: 𝑧 = (𝛽𝑎 − 𝛽𝑏) (𝑆𝐸𝛽𝑎
2 + 𝑆𝐸𝛽𝑏
2)
1 2⁄
⁄  (Clogg, 
Petkova, & Haritou, 1995).  
14 We conduct several additional robustness checks. For example, we employ the reference portfolio-adjusted three-year BHAR 
without transformation (BHAR36) as the dependent variable, the results of which are qualitatively similar to those using the 
transformed variable (LNBHAR36). Also, we winsorize the extreme values of the dependent variable of LNBHAR36 and each IB 
reputation variable at 1% and 99% prior to regression estimation, to avoid any potential misleading conclusions resulted from 
outliers. The results based on a trimmed sample of 1,679 observations are also qualitatively the same, suggesting that outliers do 
not appear to be driving the results. These results are not tabulated for the sake of brevity, but available on request. 
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address the well-recognized problem of endogeneity, we employ the standard 2SLS estimation (Habib & 
Ljungqvist, 2001; Ljungqvist, Jenkinson, & Wilhelm, 2003; Fernando et al., 2005) and the Heckman (1979) 
two-stage procedure (Schenone, 2004; Fang, 2005; McCahery & Schwienbacher, 2010) in this sub-section.  
4.4.1. Standard 2SLS Estimation 
The standard 2SLS estimation is based on the estimated reputation ranking from a first-stage regression 
rather than using the proxies for IB reputation developed in Sub-section 3.2. Motivated by a recent study 
of Tian (2011),15 we construct an instrumental variable (IV) for the reputation ranking of the closest IB to 
each IPO firm.16 We believe that the IB nearest the IPO firm is more likely to obtain the mandate to lead 
the IPO because of the lower information costs implied by less distance. The first-stage regression is: 
(𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁  𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑇) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑉 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜀1,  (7) 
where IV represents the instrumental variable, measured by the reputation ranking of the closest IB to each 
IPO firm; two IB reputation variables and all control variables are as defined in Appendix IV; ε1 represents 
the error term. 
The second-stage regression is: 
𝐿𝑁𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅36 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × (𝐼𝐵?̂?𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁 𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝐵?̂?𝐴𝐿𝑇) + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 +
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜀2,  
(8) 
where the estimated value of 𝐼𝐵?̂?𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁  or 𝐼𝐵?̂?𝐴𝐿𝑇  is obtained using coefficients from the first-stage 
regression; the dependent variable and all control variables are as defined in Appendix IV; ε2 represents the 
error term. 
Panel A of Table 7 reports the standard 2SLS regression results, based on the main proxy for IB reputation 
(IBRMAIN). Specifically, the first-stage regression results show that the instrumental variable of IV has a 
significantly positive effect on IBRMAIN at the 5% level (t-stat = 2.49; t-stat = 2.54) in Regressions (9) and 
(11), respectively, during the pre- and post-reform periods, suggesting the existence of a self-selection bias. 
The standard Hausman (1978) test also rejects the exogeneity of IB reputation (F = 11.936, p-value = 0.000; 
F = 11.714, p-value = 0.000) at the 1% level. The adjusted R2 of 0.273 and 0.284 imply the relatively strong 
explanatory power for the total first-stage model. To test whether this R2 overstates the true explanatory 
power of IV in the first-stage regression, we also calculate the partial R2 and partial F-stat (Fp). A partial 
R2 of 0.217 or 0.220 with a statistically significant F-stat at the 1% level (Fp = 12.148, p-value = 0.000; Fp 
= 11.584, p-value = 0.000) indicates the decent strength of IV in the first-stage regression. In sum, our 
                                                          
15 Tian (2010) uses geographic location information about the entrepreneurial firm and the distance between the venture capital 
(VC) and the IPO firm. 
16 We discover the addresses of the headquarters of all IPO firms and IBs from the listing prospectuses and the official websites of 
the Securities Association of China (SAC). The latitude and longitude coordinates to each headquarter are obtained from Google 
Earth. We calculate mileage between two pairs of latitudes and longitudes using the great circle distance formula (See details in 
Appendix B in Tian, 2011). 
 
 
15 
diagnostic tests confirm the reliability of results in the first-stage regression and the relatively strong 
explanatory power of the chosen instrumental variable. 
<Table 7> 
The second-stage regression results in Panel A of Table 7 also show statistically insignificant coefficients 
on 𝐼𝐵?̂?𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁 (t-stat = 0.39) in Regression (10), during the pre-reform period, and significantly positive 
coefficient on 𝐼𝐵?̂?𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁 at the 1% level (t-stat = 2.71) in Regression (12), during the post-reform period. 
Consistent results are presented in Panel B based on the alternative proxy for IB reputation (IBRALT), 
confirming that our previous results in Tables 4 and 6—IB reputation has no impact on the long-term stock 
performance of IPOs during the pre-reform period, but a significantly positive impact during the post-
reform period—continue to hold true after controlling for the problem of endogeneity using the standard 
2SLS estimation.  
4.4.2. Heckman (1979) Two-Stage Procedure 
We also employ the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure to deal with the self-selection bias. In the first-
stage regression, we use a probit model to estimate the probability that an issuer chooses a more prestigious 
IB. The first-stage probit regression (selection equation) is: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐼𝐵 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑉 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜀1, (9) 
where the binary dependent variable is set to 1 for IPOs managed by more prestigious IBs with a reputation 
ranking of the median value of IBRMAIN or IBRALT or above, and 0 otherwise; IV represents the instrumental 
variable, measured by the reputation ranking of the closest IB to each IPO firm; IB reputation variables and 
all control variables are as defined in Appendix IV; ε1 represents the error term.  
The second-stage OLS regression includes the inverse Mills ratio (λ) derived from the first-stage regression 
as an additional regressor to correct for the self-selection bias.17 The second-stage OLS regression is:  
𝐿𝑁𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅36 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐼𝐵𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁 𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑇) + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽3𝜆 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 +
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜀2,  
(10) 
where λ represents the inverse Mills ratio, generated from the first-stage regression; the dependent variable, 
two IB reputation variables, and all control variables are as defined in Appendix IV; ε2 represents the error 
term. 
<Table 8> 
Table 8 reports the Heckman (1979) two-stage results, based either on the main proxy (IBRMAIN, in Panel 
A) or the alternative proxy (IBRALT, in Panel B) for IB reputation, again confirming our previous results. 
Specifically, in Panel A, the first-stage probit model suggests the presence of a self-selection bias. For 
                                                          
17  𝜆𝑖 = 𝜙(𝛾𝑍𝑖) [1 − 𝛷(𝛾𝑍𝑖)]⁄ ,  where ϕ represents the standard normal density function; Φ represents the standard normal 
cumulative distribution function; γ represents the first-stage probit estimation of the selection equation; Z represents the 
corresponding explanatory variables in the probit regression. 
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example, the probability of matching with a more prestigious IB increases with the offering size and the 
fraction of state-owned shares by total shares outstanding of the IPO firm. The selection equation has 
reasonable explanatory power as evidenced by the McFadden R2 of 0.263 and 0.254 in Regressions (17) 
and (19), respectively. In addition, the inverse Mills ratio (λ) in the second-stage OLS regression is 
significantly positive at the 5% level (t-stat = 2.46; t-stat = 2.50) in Regressions (18) and (20), respectively, 
implying the importance of taking the problem of endogeneity into account. The coefficients and statistical 
significances of other independent variables remain qualitatively similar to those presented in Table 6.  
4.5. Correcting for the Cross-Sectional Correlations in Abnormal Returns 
Finally, to address potential cross-sectional correlations in the event-time abnormal returns, we examine 
the calendar-time returns for IPOs with time-series t-statistics. First, we create a diversified portfolio 
including all available firms going public during the last three years in each calendar month from January 
1994 to December 2013. We then segment all IPOs into Low and High reputation groups based on the 
median value of IBRMAIN or IBRALT. The mean monthly abnormal return for each IPO group is adjusted 
using the reference portfolio benchmark. The final rows in Table 9 show statistically insignificant 
differences of mean monthly abnormal returns between Low and High reputation groups, 0.098% (t-stat = 
0.70) or 0.084% (t-stat = 0.61), during the pre-reform period, while, during the post-reform period, the 
mean monthly abnormal return of IPOs in High reputation group is significantly higher than that of IPOs 
in Low reputation group by 0.303% (t-stat = 2.71) or 0.338% (t-stat = 2.83) at the 1% level.  
<Tables 9 & 10> 
In addition, we estimate the weighted least squares (WLS) regressions where observations are weighted by 
the square root of the number of IPOs in the portfolio (Gompers & Lerner, 2003). We report the WLS 
regression results in Table 10 using the Fama & French (1993) three-factor model (in Panel A) and the 
Carhart (1997) four-factor model (in Panel B). For example, Panel A shows that the difference of intercepts 
between Low and High reputation groups is statistically insignificant (t-stat = 0.51; t-stat = 0.42) during 
the pre-reform period, while the difference becomes statistically significant at 1% level (t-stat = 2.57; t-stat 
= 2.66) during the post-reform period. Similar results are presented in Panel B of Table 10, concluding that 
the calendar-time results are consistent with our previous event-time results. 
5. Conclusions 
This study examines the long-term stock performance of 1,749 IPOs in the China stock market over the 
period 1993 to 2010, with specific emphasis on the comparison of the impacts of IB reputation before and 
after the 2001 IPO allocation system reform. We develop two time-varying proxies for IB reputation based 
on the three-year moving average of the aggregate gross proceeds raised or the total number of IPOs 
managed by each IB in each calendar year. We find that IB reputation has no impact on the reference 
portfolio-adjusted three-year BHARs during the pre-reform period, but a significantly positive impact 
during the post-reform period. Our results are robust to various checks with the use of alternative 
methodological approaches, such as the standard 2SLS estimation and the Heckman (1979) two-stage 
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procedure in controlling for the problem of endogeneity (a potential self-selection bias) as well as the 
calendar-time portfolio approach in correcting for the cross-sectional correlations in abnormal returns. 
Our results not only contribute to the finance literature by providing additional empirical evidence on 
differential relationship between IB reputation and IPO long-term stock performance in an emerging market 
context, but have important relevance to financial regulators and market practitioners. The 2001 allocation 
system reform is successful in providing Chinese IBs with more discretionary power in allocating and 
pricing IPOs, and helps improve IPO price performance in the long term. In addition, the observed 
significantly positive impact of IB reputation on the long-term stock performance of IPOs during the post-
reform period is of interest to investors, in particular, to international practitioners, such as the QFIIs, that 
is, investing in IPOs managed by more prestigious IBs will generate more profits in the long term.  
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Table 1: Distribution of IPOs by the Year of Issuing 
 Whole market   SHSE  SZSE 
Cohort year Gross proceeds N  Gross proceeds N  Gross proceeds N 
1993 31,658.68 97  20,700.41 53  10,958.27 44 
1994 5,479.99 27  4,200.31 19  1,279.68 8 
1995 3,332.12 14  1,935.85 8  1,396.27 6 
1996 22,663.90 151  10,537.92 70  12,125.98 81 
1997 65,263.03 171  28,009.64 76  37,253.39 95 
1998 39,682.23 92  20,939.86 45  18,742.37 47 
1999 45,133.97 81  19,605.87 36  25,528.10 45 
2000 78,365.42 126  57,165.31 88  21,200.11 38 
2001 57,814.20 64  57,814.20 64  -- -- 
2002 28,422.93 64  28,422.93 64  -- -- 
2003 42,047.06 65  42,047.06 65  -- -- 
2004 32,810.24 95  23,727.06 58  9,083.18 37 
2005 5,763.07 15  2,854.54 3  2,908.53 12 
2006 62,682.72 65  45,027.79 9  17,654.93 56 
2007 223,594.70 106  194,077.46 14  29,517.24 92 
2008 90,205.50 73  65,194.40 5  25,011.10 68 
2009 159,949.39 106  98,226.43 8  61,722.96 98 
2010 327,069.50 337  70,536.57 22  256,532.93 315 
Pre-reform period 310,481.94 786  181,997.77 422  128,484.17 364 
Post-reform period 1,011,456.71 963  609,025.84 285  402,430.87 678 
Main Board 919,507.78 1,071  791,023.61 707  128,484.17 364 
SME Board 297,712.15 524  -- --  297,712.15 524 
ChiNext Board 104,718.72 154  -- --  104,718.72 154 
Full sample  1,321,938.65 1,749  791,023.61 707  530,915.04 1,042 
This table presents the distribution of the sample of 1,749 IPOs over the period 1993 to 2010, by the year of issuing, in terms of 
the raised aggregate gross proceeds and the total number of IPOs. The gross proceeds are presented in millions of RMB, adjusted 
using CPI (2005 = 100). RMB 1.00 was approximately USD 0.1239 on December 31, 2005. The whole sample consists of 786 
IPOs issued during the pre-reform period and 963 IPOs issued during the post-reform period. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations for All Variables 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 BHAR36 IBRMAIN  IBRALT  IR LAG AGE SIZE STATE MARKET 
 Pre-reform period 
Mean –4.440 6.866 5.736 142.960 59.280 1.919 395.015 46.649 4.028 
Median –0.008 7.694 4.500 117.079 28.000 1.341 280.435 53.580 2.401 
Min. –446.615 1.447 0.333 –130.138 7.000 0.378 21.360 0 –14.944 
Max. 210.500 10.000 18.000 3512.634 1,951.000 11.819 8,390.934 88.084 47.591 
St. Dev. 47.687 2.491 4.714 174.898 150.269 2.159 478.764 25.189 8.134 
 Post-reform period 
Mean 6.430 6.142 4.776 86.563 14.025 5.611 1,050.318 18.219 1.218 
Median –8.768 6.695 2.708 63.670 14.000 4.556 447.567 0 1.046 
Min. –507.279 1.389 0.333 –11.221 7.000 0.192 89.146 0 –18.128 
Max. 2,184.081 10.000 19.667 525.752 50.000 26.334 62,851.072 86.286 22.383 
St. Dev. 124.511 2.191 4.963 82.474 4.618 3.911 3,677.965 26.942 6.163 
Panel B: Pearson correlation coefficients 
 LNBHAR36 IBRMAIN  IBRALT  IR LNLAG LN(AGE +1) LNSIZE STATE MARKET 
  Correlation matrix for IPOs issued during the pre-reform period in the upper triangle 
LNBHAR36 1 0.054 0.077 –0.059 –0.026 0.026 0.090 0.111 0.073 
IBRMAIN 0.043 1 0.732 –0.070 –0.101 0.145 0.207 0.150 0.147 
IBRALT 0.051 0.573 1 –0.031 –0.104 0.211 0.078 0.163 0.131 
IR –0.041 –0.185 –0.177 1 0.284 –0.054 –0.344 –0.091 0.093 
LNLAG –0.009 –0.074 –0.199 0.284 1 –0.214 –0.020 –0.0139 –0.127 
LN(AGE +1) 0.021 0.013 0.070 –0.054 –0.133 1 0.098 0.414 0.180 
LNSIZE 0.026 0.326 0.184 –0.344 –0.226 0.031 1 0.254 0.197 
STATE 0.030 0.071 0.215 –0.091 –0.191 0.195 0.170 1 0.080 
MARKET 0.052 0.091 0.012 0.093 –0.128 0.139 0.038 0.043 1 
  Correlation matrix for IPOs issued during the post-reform period in the lower triangle 
This table presents descriptive statistics (in Panel A) and Pearson correlation coefficients (in Panel B) for all variables, during the 
pre- and post-reform periods. The whole sample consists of 786 IPOs issued during the pre-reform period and 963 IPOs issued 
during the post-reform period. SIZE is presented in millions of RMB, adjusted using CPI (2005 = 100), while BHAR36, IR, STATE, 
and MARKET are presented in percentage. All variables are as defined in Appendix IV. 
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Table 3: IPO Long-Term Stock Performance 
 Pre-reform period  Post-reform period 
Event month N BHRi,T BHRp,T BHART 𝒕𝒔𝒂(𝑩𝑯𝑨𝑹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑻)  N BHRi,T BHRp,T BHART 𝒕𝒔𝒂(𝑩𝑯𝑨𝑹̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑻) 
3 786 2.173 2.275 –0.101 (–0.13)  963 –5.676 –4.623 –1.053 (–0.96) 
6 786 9.233 10.049 –0.816 (–0.99)  963 –5.432 –6.654 1.222 (1.16) 
9 786 13.657 14.947 –1.289 (–1.28)  963 –5.828 –7.310 1.482 (1.27) 
12 (1 year) 786 17.253 18.960 –1.707 (–1.74)*  963 –7.469 –9.362 1.892 (1.38) 
15 786 18.235 20.597 –2.363 (–1.90)*  963 –10.002 –12.774 2.772 (1.46) 
18 786 21.952 24.601 –2.649 (–1.91)*  963 –12.779 –16.281 3.502 (1.66)* 
21 786 27.473 30.424 –2.951 (–2.27)**  963 –15.351 –19.349 3.998 (1.89)* 
24 (2 years) 786 31.184 34.245 –3.061 (–2.29)**  963 –16.139 –20.466 4.326 (2.01)** 
27 786 34.349 38.160 –3.811 (–2.36)**  963 –10.383 –15.008 4.625 (2.15)** 
30 786 37.581 41.555 –3.974 (–2.39)**  963 0.177 –5.049 5.226 (2.41)** 
33 786 46.363 50.531 –4.168 (–2.42)**  963 11.176 5.296 5.880 (2.61)*** 
36 (3 years) 786 55.933 60.373 –4.440 (–2.59)***  963 20.797 14.367 6.430 (2.75)*** 
This table presents the equal-weighted reference portfolio-adjusted BHARs of IPOs issued during the pre-reform period and IPOs 
issued during the post-reform period, over a period of 36 event months after listing, excluding the initial returns. Each IPO firm 
in the sample is matched to a reference portfolio based on the existing listed firms classified with similar size and B/M as well as 
within the same industry category, according to the two-digit ICB codes. The whole sample consists of 786 IPOs issued during 
the pre-reform period and 963 IPOs issued during the post-reform period. 
The average annual number of trading days over the period 1993 to 2010 in the China stock market is 242, with an average of 20 
trading days per month. So an event month is defined as a 20-trading-day interval following the first trading day. The initial return 
period is defined to be month 0; month 1 consists of event days 2–21; month 2 consists of event days 22–41, and so forth. 
Following the calculations proposed by Loughran & Ritter (1995), we define the reference portfolio-adjusted BHARi,T on the IPO 
i for a holding period of T months as: 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇 = 𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑇 − 𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑝,𝑇 = [∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡) −  1
𝑇
𝑡=1 ] − [∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑝,𝑡) −  1
𝑇
𝑡=1 ], where Ri,t 
and Rp,t are the monthly returns on IPO i and its reference portfolio, respectively, in event month t following listing; BHRi,T and 
BHRp,T are the buy-and-hold returns on IPO i and its reference portfolio, respectively. The equal-weighted reference portfolio-
adjusted 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑇 on N IPOs for a holding period T months is computed as: 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑇 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇
𝑁
𝑖=1 .  
The bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistics (tsa) are used to evaluate the significance of 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑇 : 𝑡𝑠𝑎(𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑇) =
√𝑁 (𝑆 + 
1
3
𝛾𝑆2 +  
1
6𝑁
𝛾),  where 𝑆 =  
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑇
𝜎(𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑇)
 and 𝛾 =  
∑ (𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇−𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑇)
3𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁𝜎(𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑇)
3 ,  where 𝛾  is the estimation of the coefficient of 
skewness. Like Lyon et al. (1999), we draw 1,000 bootstrapped re-samples from the original sample size, nb = N/4, where N is the 
original sample size for the calculation of the long-term stock performance of IPOs, and b is the draw from 1 to 1,000. For each 
re-sample, tsa is recalculated using the smaller sample of nb, in place of N. All returns are presented in percentage and t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Univariate Analysis Results 
 Pre-reform period  Post-reform period 
 N Mean Median St. Dev.  N Mean Median St. Dev. 
Panel A: Main proxy for IB reputation (IBRMAIN) 
Low IBRMAIN 30 236 –4.127 –4.037 57.822  289 –0.556 –0.996 9.228 
Medium IBRMAIN 40 314 –4.479 –3.525 46.401  385 7.476 8.452 77.730 
High IBRMAIN 30 236 –4.700 –4.156 36.243  289 12.023 12.834 104.284 
Difference between High and Low  0.573 0.119    12.579 13.830  
t-stat  (1.24) (1.09)    (3.43)*** (2.82)***  
Kruskal–Wallis χ2  (1.64) (1.43)    (19.25)*** (15.40)***  
Panel B: Alternative proxy for IB reputation (IBRALT) 
Low IBRALT 30 236 –4.041 –4.130 46.859  289 –1.293 –1.335 10.755 
Medium IBRALT 40 314 –4.464 –4.317 52.279  385 7.672 8.645 81.315 
High IBRALT 30 236 –4.806 –4.509 41.161  289 12.499 13.604 135.840 
Difference between High and Low  0.765 0.379    13.792 14.939  
t-stat  (1.13) (1.05)    (4.06)*** (3.26)***  
Kruskal–Wallis χ2  (1.44) (1.24)    (22.01)*** (16.06)***  
This table presents the univariate analysis results of the long-term stock performance of IPOs issued during the pre- and post-
reform periods. The long-term stock performance of IPOs is calculated as the equal-weighted reference portfolio-adjusted three-
year BHARs. Each IPO firm in the sample is matched to a reference portfolio based on the existing listed firms classified with 
similar size and B/M as well as within the same industry category, according to the two-digit ICB codes. The whole sample 
consists of 786 IPOs issued during the pre-reform period and 963 IPOs issued during the post-reform period. During the pre- and 
post-reform periods, all IPOs are sorted by IBRMAIN (in Panel A) or IBRALT (in Panel B) into three reputation groups: Low, Medium, 
or High, according to whether the value of IBRMAIN or IBRALT is included in the lowest 30, middle 40, or highest 30 percentile. 
IBRMAIN and IBRALT represent the three-year moving average (t –3, t –2, t –1) of the aggregate gross proceeds raised and the total 
number of IPOs managed, respectively, by each IB in each calendar year t, over the sample period. The mean and median BHARs 
of IPOs and the standard deviation (St. Dev.) are displayed in percentage and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Both 
parametric (t-stat) and non-parametric test statistics (Kruskal–Wallis χ2) are employed to test the differences of mean returns 
between the Low and High reputation groups. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 level.  
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Table 5: Regional Analysis Results 
 N Mean High Low High – Low t-stat Kruskal–Wallis χ2 
Panel A: Main proxy for IB reputation (IBRMAIN) 
Pre-reform period 
IPO firms and their IBs in the same regions  254 –1.193 –0.166 –2.221 2.055 (1.90)* (2.86)* 
IPO firms and their IBs in the different regions 532 –5.990 –5.764 –6.216 0.452 (1.06) (1.79) 
Post-reform period 
IPO firms and their IBs in the same regions  197 7.086 9.729 4.443 5.286 (2.72)*** (16.92)*** 
IPO firms and their IBs in the different regions 766 6.261 8.806 3.717 5.089 (2.64)*** (13.50)*** 
Panel B: Alternative proxy for IB reputation (IBRALT) 
Pre-reform period 
IPO firms and their IBs in the same regions  254 –1.193 –0.144 –2.242 2.098 (1.75)* (2.72)* 
IPO firms and their IBs in the different regions 532 –5.990 –5.600 –6.380 0.780 (0.91) (2.33) 
Post-reform period 
IPO firms and their IBs in the same regions  197 7.086 9.475 4.697 4.778 (3.41)*** (22.44)*** 
IPO firms and their IBs in the different regions 766 6.261 8.931 3.591 5.340 (2.82)*** (17.12)*** 
This table presents the regional analysis results of the long-term stock performance of IPOs issued during the pre- and post-reform 
periods. The long-term stock performance of IPOs is calculated as the equal-weighted reference portfolio-adjusted three-year 
BHARs. Each IPO firm in the sample is matched to a reference portfolio based on the existing listed firms classified with similar 
size and B/M as well as within the same industry category, according to the two-digit ICB codes. The whole sample consists of 
786 IPOs issued during the pre-reform period and 963 IPOs issued during the post-reform period. During the pre- and post-reform 
periods, all IPOs are divided into two region groups, according to whether IPO firms and their IBs are located in the same or 
different regions. In each regional group, all IPO firms are sorted by IBRMAIN (in Panel A) or IBRALT (in Panel B) into two reputation 
groups: Low or High, based on the median value of IBRMAIN or IBRALT. IBRMAIN and IBRALT represent the three-year moving average 
(t –3, t –2, t –1) of the aggregate gross proceeds raised and the total number of IPOs managed, respectively, by each IB in each 
calendar year t, over the sample period. The mean BHARs of IPOs are displayed in percentage and t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Both parametric (t-stat) and non-parametric test statistics (Kruskal–Wallis χ2) are employed to test the differences of 
mean returns between the Low and High reputation groups for each region group. * and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10 and 1 levels, respectively.  
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Table 6: OLS Regression Results 
 Pre-reform period  Post-reform period 
 Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat 
Panel A: Using an whole sample of 1,749 IPOs on the SHSE and SZSE 
 Regression (1)  Regression (2)  Regression (3)  Regression (4) 
Intercept 2.174   2.141   2.290   2.277  
IBRMAIN 0.013 (0.15)     0.055 (2.90)
***    
IBRALT    0.026 (0.88)     0.061 (3.04)
*** 
IR –0.017 (–1.90)*  –0.019 (–1. 92)*  –0.012 (–1.88)*  –0.015 (–1.87)* 
LNLAG –0.030 (–2.95)***  –0.033 (–2.84)***  –0.006 (–0.40)  –0.005 (–0.58) 
LN(AGE +1) 0.006 (1.63)  0.007 (1.57)  0.008 (1.15)  0.009 (1.10) 
LNSIZE 0.015 (2.13)**  0.016 (2.08)**  0.009 (1.61)  0.008 (1.83)* 
STATE 0.027 (2.73)***  0.030 (2.63)***  0.010 (0.56)  0.017 (0.77) 
MARKET 0.029 (1.24)  0.034 (1.28)  0.080 (1.32)  0.093 (1.35) 
YEAR YES   YES   YES   YES  
INDUSTRY YES   YES   YES   YES  
Adj. R2 0.069   0.064   0.211   0.216  
Panel B: Using a sub-sample of 707 IPOs on the SHSE 
 Regression (5)  Regression (6)  Regression (7)  Regression (8) 
Intercept 2.118   2.120   2.242   2.215  
IBRMAIN 0.029 (0.27)     0.054 (2.66)
***    
IBRALT    0.021 (0.44)     0.060 (2.65)
*** 
IR –0.018 (–1.93)*  –0.016 (–1.93)*  –0.015 (–1.38)  –0.016 (–1.41) 
LNLAG –0.032 (–2.12)**  –0.027 (–2.29)**  –0.005 (–0.25)  –0.009 (–0.60) 
LN(AGE +1) 0.006 (1.59)  0.008 (1.57)  0.017 (1.60)  0.020 (1.57) 
LNSIZE 0.019 (2.27)**  0.021 (2.17)**  0.004 (1.37)  0.006 (1.55) 
STATE 0.018 (1.55)  0.020 (1.55)  0.037 (1.21)  0.039 (1.25) 
MARKET 0.024 (0.66)  0.027 (1.22)  0.062 (0.76)  0.060 (0.78) 
YEAR YES   YES   YES   YES  
INDUSTRY YES   YES   YES   YES  
Adj. R2 0.081   0.089   0.194   0.186  
This table presents the OLS regression results on the long-term stock performance of IPOs issued during the pre- and post-reform 
periods. The results presented in Panels A are based on the whole sample of 1,749 IPOs either on the SHSE or SZSE, while the 
results presented in Panel B are based on the sub-sample of 707 IPOs on the SHSE. The long-term stock performance of IPOs is 
calculated as the equal-weighted reference portfolio-adjusted three-year BHARs. Each IPO firm in the sample is matched to a 
reference portfolio based on the existing listed firms classified with similar size and B/M as well as within the same industry 
category, according to the two-digit ICB codes. The whole sample consists of 786 IPOs issued during the pre-reform period and 
963 IPOs issued during the post-reform period. All variables are as defined in Appendix IV. We also control for the potential year 
and industry fixed effects using indicator variables for years and industries, according to the two-digit ICB codes. The White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 7: 2SLS Regression Results 
 Pre-reform period  Post-reform period 
 First-stage regression  Second-stage regression  First-stage regression  Second-stage regression 
 Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat 
Panel A: Main proxy for IB reputation (IBRMAIN) 
 Regression (9)  Regression (10)  Regression (11)  Regression (12) 
Intercept 5.065   2.124   5.186   2.172  
𝐼𝐵?̂?𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁    0.014 (0.39)     0.064 (2.71)
*** 
IV 0.526 (2.49)**     0.554 (2.54)**    
IR –0.030 (–0.55)  –0.006 (–1.91)*  –0.084 (–0.81)  –0.017 (–1.33) 
LNLAG –0.137 (–1.18)  –0.004 (–2.13)**  –0.122 (–0.86)  –0.005 (–0.42) 
LN(AGE +1) 0.103 (0.81)  0.006 (1.40)  0.049 (0.41)  0.012 (0.96) 
LNSIZE 0.858 (2.30)**  0.013 (2.29)**  0.820 (2.39)**  0.005 (0.80) 
STATE 0.909 (2.25)**  0.026 (2.42)**  0.054 (0.18)  0.006 (0.85) 
MARKET 0.533 (1.01)  0.025 (1.27)  0.440 (0.92)  0.066 (1.14) 
YEAR YES   YES   YES   YES  
INDUSTRY YES   YES   YES   YES  
Adj. R2 0.273   0.064   0.284   0.293  
Partial R2 0.217      0.220     
Partial F-stat Fp = 12.148 (p-value = 0.000)  Fp = 11.584 (p-value = 0.000) 
Hausman test F = 11.936 (p-value = 0.000)  F = 11.714 (p-value = 0.000) 
Panel B: Alternative proxy for IB reputation (IBRALT) 
 Regression (13)  Regression (14)  Regression (15)  Regression (16) 
Intercept 5.319   2.152   5.436   2.147  
𝐼𝐵?̂?𝐴𝐿𝑇    0.025 (0.71)     0.072 (2.91)
*** 
IV 0.531 (2.48)**     0.560 (2.54)**    
IR –0.096 (–0.96)  –0.005 (–1.91)*  –0.090 (–0.81)  –0.031 (–1.62) 
LNLAG –0.047 (–0.59)  –0.004 (–2.08)**  –0.126 (–0.79)  –0.005 (–0.35) 
LN(AGE +1) 0.060 (0.61)  0.007 (1.58)  0.046 (0.47)  0.015 (0.82) 
LNSIZE 0.926 (1.80)*  0.016 (2.35)**  0.983 (2.45)**  0.006 (1.19) 
STATE 0.988 (2.23)**  0.029 (2.58)***  0.057 (0.15)  0.007 (0.76) 
MARKET 0.414 (0.87)  0.030 (1.16)  0.325 (0.42)  0.070 (1.49) 
YEAR YES   YES   YES   YES  
INDUSTRY YES   YES   YES   YES  
Adj. R2 0.271   0.059   0.287   0.345  
Partial R2 0.197      0.207     
Partial F-stat Fp = 13.125 (p-value = 0.000)  Fp = 12.984 (p-value = 0.000) 
Hausman test F = 12.652 (p-value = 0.000)  F = 12.548 (p-value = 0.000) 
This table presents the 2SLS regression results on the long-term stock performance of IPOs issued during the pre- and post-reform 
periods. The long-term stock performance of IPOs is calculated as the equal-weighted reference portfolio-adjusted three-year 
BHARs. Each IPO firm in the sample is matched to a reference portfolio based on the existing listed firms classified with similar 
size and B/M as well as within the same industry category, according to the two-digit ICB codes. The whole sample consists of 
786 IPOs issued during the pre-reform period and 963 IPOs issued during the post-reform period. The first-stage regressions use 
IBRMAIN (in Panel A) or IBRALT (in Panel B) as the dependent variable. IV represents the instrumental variable of the reputation of 
the closest IB to each IPO firm. We also control for the potential year and industry fixed effects using indicator variables for years 
and industries, according to the two-digit ICB codes. The second-stage OLS regressions replicate Regressions (1–4) in Table 6 
with the use of LNBHAR36 as the dependent variable, replacing IBRMAIN or IBRALT with the predicted value of 
𝐼𝐵?̂?𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁 𝑜𝑟 𝐼𝐵?̂?𝐴𝐿𝑇 obtained with coefficients of the first-stage regression. All variables are as defined in Appendix IV. The 
White heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1 levels, respectively. 
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Table 8: Heckman (1979) Two-Stage Results 
 Pre-reform period  Post-reform period 
 
First-stage                
probit regression 
 
Second-stage                   
OLS regression 
 
First-stage                
probit regression 
 
Second-stage                   
OLS regression 
 Coefficient z-stat  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient z-stat  Coefficient t-stat 
Panel A: Main proxy for IB reputation (IBRMAIN) 
 Regression (17)  Regression (18)  Regression (19)  Regression (20) 
Intercept 0.636   2.165   0.620   2.183  
IBRMAIN    0.014 (0.48)     0.066 (2.78)
*** 
IV 0.434 (2.37)**     0.560 (2.46)**    
IR –0.016 (–0.48)  –0.005 (–1.85)*  –0.098 (–0.60)  –0.013 (–1.33) 
LNLAG –0.178 (–0.73)  –0.006 (–2.40)**  –0.151 (–0.78)  –0.005 (–0.28) 
LN(AGE+1) 0.098 (0.51)  0.007 (1.54)  0.011 (0.17)  0.019 (1.24) 
LNSIZE 0.332 (2.30)**  0.015 (2.22)**  0.551 (2.49)**  0.008 (0.86) 
STATE 0.664 (2.37)**  0.027 (2.46)**  0.465 (1.84)*  0.010 (0.79) 
MARKET 0.544 (0.96)  0.028 (1.21)  0.506 (0.86)  0.073 (1.17) 
λ    0.802 (2.46)**     0.713 (2.50)** 
YEAR YES   YES   YES   YES  
INDUSTRY YES   YES   YES   YES  
McFadden R2 0.263   0.064   0.254   0.345  
Panel B: Alternative proxy for IB reputation (IBRALT) 
 Regression (21)  Regression (22)  Regression (23)  Regression (24) 
Intercept 0.622   2.156   0.609   2.200  
IBRALT    0.023 (0.62)     0.075 (2.89)
*** 
IV 0.466 (2.31)**     0.486 (2.27)**    
IR –0.019 (–0.59)  –0.006 (–1.89)*  –0.050 (–0.81)  –0.014 (–1.36) 
LNLAG –0.188 (–0.81)  –0.004 (–2.27)**  –0.174 (–0.97)  –0.003 (–0.25) 
LN(AGE+1) 0.052 (0.29)  0.007 (1.46)  0.009 (0.13)  0.015 (1.33) 
LNSIZE 0.286 (2.48)**  0.016 (2.28)**  0.287 (2.11)**  0.011 (0.69) 
STATE 0.493 (2.36)**  0.025 (2.32)**  0.082 (1.82)*  0.018 (1.19) 
MARKET 0.709 (1.13)  0.030 (1.20)  0.465 (0.76)  0.087 (1.29) 
λ    0.710 (2.36)**     0.676 (2.48)** 
YEAR YES   YES   YES   YES  
INDUSTRY YES   YES   YES   YES  
McFadden R2 0.265   0.054   0.262   0.357  
This table presents the Heckman (1979) two-stage results on the long-term stock performance of IPOs issued during the pre- and 
post-reform periods. The long-term stock performance of IPOs is calculated as the equal-weighted reference portfolio-adjusted 
three-year BHARs. Each IPO firm in the sample is matched to a reference portfolio based on the existing listed firms classified 
with similar size and B/M as well as within the same industry category, according to the two-digit ICB codes. The whole sample 
consists of 786 IPOs issued during the pre-reform period and 963 IPOs issued during the post-reform period. In the first-stage 
regression, we use a probit model to estimate the probability that an issuer to choose a more prestigious IB. The binary dependent 
variable is set to 1 for IPOs managed by more prestigious IBs with a reputation ranking of the median value of IBRMAIN (in Panel 
A) or INRALT (in Panel B) or above, and 0 otherwise. IV represents the instrumental variable, measured by the reputation ranking 
of the closest IB to each IPO firm. We also control for the potential year and industry fixed effects using indicator variables for 
years and industries, according to the two-digit ICB codes. The second-stage OLS regression includes the inverse Mills ratio (λ) 
derived from the first-stage regression as an additional regressor to correct for the self-selection bias. 𝜆𝑖 = 𝜙(𝛾𝑍𝑖) [1 − 𝛷(𝛾𝑍𝑖)]⁄ , 
where ϕ represents the standard normal density function; Φ represents the standard normal cumulative distribution function; γ 
represents the first-stage probit estimation of the selection equation; Z represents the corresponding explanatory variables in the 
probit regression. All variables are as defined in Appendix IV. The White heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 levels, respectively.  
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Table 9: Calendar-Time Abnormal Returns 
   Main proxy for IB reputation (IBRMAIN)  Alternative proxy for IB reputation (IBRALT) 
Cohort year Full sample  Low High High – Low  Low High High – Low 
1994 –3.379  –3.755 –3.003 0.752  –3.704 –3.054 0.650 
1995 0.668  0.475 0.861 0.386  0.485 0.851 0.366 
1996 –0.556  –0.226 –0.886 –0.660  –0.220 –0.893 –0.673 
1997 –0.394  –0.594 –0.195 0.399  –0.509 –0.280 0.229 
1998 0.829  0.935 0.723 –0.212  0.840 0.818 –0.022 
1999 –0.003  –0.042 0.036 0.078  –0.035 0.030 0.065 
2000 1.749  1.857 1.642 –0.215  1.863 1.635 –0.228 
2001 0.501  0.416 0.585 0.169  0.401 0.601 0.200 
2002 –0.648  –0.667 –0.628 0.039  –0.795 –0.500 0.295 
2003 –2.013  –2.338 –1.687 0.651  –2.429 –1.596 0.833 
2004 0.443  0.31 0.576 0.266  0.285 0.601 0.316 
2005 0.199  0.086 0.312 0.226  0.084 0.314 0.230 
2006 –0.364  –0.553 –0.175 0.378  –0.527 –0.202 0.325 
2007 0.089  0.015 0.164 0.149  –0.072 0.251 0.323 
2008 1.541  1.34 1.743 0.403  1.247 1.836 0.589 
2009 2.22  2.073 2.367 0.294  2.068 2.372 0.304 
2010 1.396  1.236 1.555 0.319  1.308 1.484 0.176 
2011 0.024  –0.078 0.126 0.204  –0.229 0.277 0.506 
2012 0.257  0.236 0.277 0.041  0.229 0.284 0.055 
2013 2.188  2.071 2.305 0.234  2.019 2.272 0.253 
Pre-reform period –0.107  –0.156 –0.058 0.098  –0.149 –0.065 0.084 
t-stat  (–0.76)  (–0.95) (–0.68) (0.70)  (–1.00) (–0.74) (0.61) 
Post-reform period 0.433  0.282 0.585 0.303  0.256 0.594 0.338 
t-stat  (3.81)***   (1.81)* (4.17)*** (2.71)***   (1.69)* (4.31)*** (2.83)*** 
This table presents the mean monthly abnormal returns on the portfolio including the whole sample of IPOs that went public on 
the SHSE or SZSE in the last three years, in each calendar year over the period January 1994 to December 2013. Each IPO firm 
in the sample is matched to a reference portfolio based on the existing listed firms classified with similar size and B/M as well as 
within the same industry category, according to the two-digit ICB codes. The whole sample consists of 786 IPOs issued during 
the pre-reform period and 963 IPOs issued during the post-reform period. The median value of IBRMAIN or IBRALT is used to 
segment all IPOs in to two groups: Low and High reputation groups. IBRMAIN and IBRALT represent the three-year moving average 
(t –3, t –2, t –1) of the aggregate gross proceeds raised and the total number of IPOs managed, respectively, by each IB in each 
calendar year t, over the sample period. The final rows report the mean monthly abnormal returns of the portfolio including IPOs 
issued during the pre- and post-reform periods. All returns are displayed in percentage and t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are 
calculated using the time-series standard deviation of the mean monthly abnormal returns. * and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10 and 1 levels, respectively.  
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Table 10: Calendar-Time WLS Regression Returns 
   Main proxy for IB reputation (IBRMAIN)  Alternative proxy for IB reputation (IBRALT) 
  Full sample Low High High – Low  Low High High – Low 
Panel A: Fama & French (1993) three-factor model 
Pre-reform period 
Intercept Coefficient –0.091 –0.120 –0.036 0.084  –0.116 –0.040 0.076 
 t-stat (–0.64) (–0.86) (–0.39)  (0.51)  (–0.88) (–0.54) (0. 42) 
Rm,t – Rf,t Coefficient 0.498 0.472 0.551 0.079  0.460 0.532 0.072 
 t-stat (2.53)** (2.55)** (2.65)*** (0.33)  (2.46)** (2.64)*** (0.25) 
SMBt Coefficient 0.618 0.608 0.740 0.132  0.603 0.731 0.128 
 t-stat (2.03)** (2.24)** (2.43)** (0.24)  (2.27)** (2.49)** (0.20) 
HMLt Coefficient –0.220 –0.235 –0.171 0.064  –0. 227 –0.161 0.066 
 t-stat (–0.64) (–0.57) (–0.51) (0.07)  (–0.58) (–0.54) (0.09) 
Adj. R2  0.149 0.151 0.165 0.053  0.156 0.147 0.051 
Post-reform period 
Intercept Coefficient 0.392 0.222 0.484 0.262  0.213 0.488 0.275 
 t-stat (2.84)*** (1.82)* (3.29)*** (2.57)***  (1.76)* (3.37)*** (2.66)*** 
Rm,t – Rf,t Coefficient 0.554 0.534 0.567 0.033  0.532 0.566 0.034 
 t-stat (2.68)*** (2.65)*** (2.72)*** (0.31)  (2.44)** (2.66)*** (0.35) 
SMBt Coefficient 0.623 0.575 0.654 0.079  0.576 0.642 0.066 
 t-stat (2.60)*** (2.56)*** (2.61)*** (0.46)  (2.59)*** (2.64)*** (0.42) 
HMLt Coefficient –0.238 –0.253 –0.221 0.032  –0.278 –0.232 0.046 
 t-stat (–0.81) (–0.44) (–0.55) (0.09)  (–0.86) (–0.73) (0.09) 
Adj. R2  0.154 0.158 0.165 0.158  0.164 0.158 0.147 
Panel B: Carhart (1997) four-factor model 
Pre-reform period 
Intercept Coefficient –0.089 –0.118 –0.031 0.087  –0.092 –0.034 0.058 
 t-stat (–0.70) (–0.73) (–0.28) (0.69)  (–0.78) (–0.53) (0.39) 
Rm,t – Rf,t Coefficient 0.451 0.432 0.465 0.033  0.439 0.474 0.035 
 t-stat (2.31)** (2.06)** (2.28)** (0.17)  (2.22)** (2.42)** (0.18) 
SMBt Coefficient 0.622 0.613 0.634 0.021  0.612 0.633 0.021 
 t-stat (2.24)** (2.24)** (2.36)** (0.21)  (2.14)** (2.22)** (0.22) 
HMLt Coefficient –0.223 –0.230 –0.203 0.027  –0.237 –0.215 0.022 
 t-stat (–0.56) (–0.62) (–0.75) (0.06)  (–0.48) (–0.65) (0.07) 
WMLt Coefficient 0.231 0.214 0.273 0.059  0.216 0.268 0.052 
 t-stat (0.98) (0.88) (0.73) (0.22)  (0.87) (0.86) (0.21) 
Adj. R2  0.159 0.161 0.172 0.059  0.164 0.153 0.058 
Post-reform period 
Intercept Coefficient 0.386 0.212 0.461 0.249  0.204 0.471 0.267 
 t-stat (2.81)*** (1.75)** (3.04)*** (2.51)**  (1.68)* (3.16)*** (2.58)*** 
Rm,t – Rf,t Coefficient 0.546 0.515 0.549 0.034  0.445 0.465 0.020 
 t-stat (2.43)** (2.24)** (2.53)** (0.35)  (2.45)** (2.53)** (0.30) 
SMBt Coefficient 0.623 0.587 0.651 0.064  0.566 0.633 0.067 
 t-stat (2.47)** (2.44)** (2.54)** (0.15)  (2.23)** (2.44)** (0.33) 
HMLt Coefficient –0.251 –0.255 –0.244 0.011  –0.265 –0.243 0.022 
 t-stat (–0.83) (–0.76) (–0.56) (0.05)  (–0.98) (–0.77) (0.11) 
WMLt Coefficient 0.221 0.214 0.224 0.010  0.212 0.223 0.011 
 t-stat (0.88) (0.64) (0.67) (0.04)  (0.79) (0.89) (0.08) 
Adj. R2  0.159 0.164 0.169 0.161  0.176 0.168 0.154 
This table presents the results based on the Fama & French (1993) three-factor model (in Panel A) and the Carhart (1997) four-
factor model (in Panel B), during the pre- and post-reform periods. The whole sample consists of 786 IPOs issued during the pre-
reform period and 963 IPOs issued during the post-reform period. The WLS regressions are used where observations are weighted 
by the square root of the number of IPOs in the portfolio. The portfolio in each month t from January 1994 to December 2013 
includes the whole sample of IPOs that went public on the SHSE or SZSE during the last three eyars. The differences between the 
monthly returns on a portfolio of IPOs and the risk-free rate (Rp,t – Rf,t) are regressed on the value-weighted return on the SHSE 
and SZSE A-Share Indices in month t, in excess of the risk-free rate (Rm,t – Rf,t), on the difference in monthly returns between 
portfolios of big and small-sized stocks (SMBt), on the difference in monthly returns between portfolios of high and low B/M 
stocks (HMLt), and on the difference in monthly returns between portfolios of past winner and loser stocks (WMLt). The median 
value of IBRMAIN or IBRALT is used to segment all IPOs in to two groups: Low and High reputation groups. IBRMAIN and IBRALT 
represent the three-year moving average (t –3, t –2, t –1) of the aggregate gross proceeds raised and the total number of IPOs 
managed, respectively, by each IB in each calendar year t, over the sample period. The t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 levels, respectively.  
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Figure 1a: Long-Term Stock Performance of IPOs Managed by IBs with High and Low Reputation, Proxied by IBRMAIN, in Terms of the Year of Issuing, Over the Period 
1993 to 2010  
 
 
 
Figure 1b: Long-Term Stock Performance of IPOs Managed by IBs with High and Low Reputation, Proxied by IBRALT, in Terms of the Year of Issuing, Over the Period 
1993 to 2010 
The long-term stock performance of IPOs is measured by the equal-weighted reference portfolio-adjusted three-year BHARs. Each IPO firm in the sample is matched to a reference portfolio based on 
the existing listed firms classified with similar size and B/M as well as within the same industry category, according to the two-digit ICB codes. The whole sample consists of 786 IPOs issued during 
the pre-reform period and 963 IPOs issued during the post-reform period. The median value of IBRMAIN (in Figure 1a) or IBRALT (in Figure 1b) is used to segment all IPOs in to two groups: Low and 
High reputation groups. IBRMAIN and IBRALT represent the three-year moving average (t –3, t –2, t –1) of the aggregate gross proceeds raised and the total number of IPOs managed, respectively, by 
each IB in each calendar year t, over the sample period. 1994-95 refers to the results of IPOs issued in both 1994 and 1995 together, while 2004-05 refers to the results of IPOs issued in both 2004 and 
2005 together, due to the limited number of 14 IPOs in 1995 and 15 IPOs in 2005. 
-50.00%
-25.00%
0.00%
25.00%
50.00%
75.00%
1993 1994-95 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004-05 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
T
h
re
e-
Y
ea
r 
B
H
A
R
s
Year of Issuing
High reputation group
Low reputation group
-50.00%
-25.00%
0.00%
25.00%
50.00%
75.00%
1993 1994-95 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004-05 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
T
h
re
e-
Y
ea
r 
B
H
A
R
s
Year of Issuing
High reputation group
Low reputation group
 
 
31 
Appendix I: Two Time-Varying Proxies for IB Reputation 
This appendix presents a complete list of 165 Chinese IBs that managed or co-managed at least one IPO on the SHSE or SZSE over period 1993 to 2010, according to the main proxy for IB reputation 
(IBRMAIN; in Panel A) and the alternative proxy for IB reputation (IBRALT; in Panel B). Specifically, for a set of IBs I in each calendar year t, we first define reputation ranking of IB i, IBRMAIN, as a 
continuous variable on [0, 10]: 10 × [ln 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖∈𝐼
(ln 𝑥𝑖,𝑡)⁄ ], where xi,t represents the raised aggregate gross proceeds by IB i in year t. The three-year moving average (t –3, t –2, t –1) reputation ranking 
of IB i in year t is computed as: IBRMAINi,t = (IBRMAINi,t–1 + IBRMAINi,t–2 + IBRMAINi,t–3)/3. The alternative proxy for IB reputation, IBRALT, is calculated based on the three-year moving average (t –3, t –
2, t –1) of the total number of IPOs managed by each IB in each calendar year t: IBRALTi,t = (Ni,t–1 + Ni,t–2 + Ni,t–3)/3. If an IPO is co-managed by two or more IBs, we split the raised aggregate gross 
proceeds and the total number of IPOs equally among them. 
IB 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Panel A: Main proxy for IB reputation (IBRMAIN) 
AJ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.71 1.71 1.71 -- -- 
Anhui -- -- -- 2.22 4.75 7.01 4.79 4.77 2.51 2.51 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Anhui Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. 7.71 3.85 2.57 2.34 4.48 7.02 4.68 2.54 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Anhui Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- 1.86 1.86 4.09 2.23 4.42 2.19 2.19 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Beijing -- 4.22 2.82 4.64 4.40 6.98 8.15 5.56 2.99 1.87 1.87 4.32 2.45 4.32 1.87 1.87 -- -- 
Beijing Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- -- 2.31 2.31 2.31 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
BOCI -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.85 5.42 5.42 5.09 5.41 8.16 5.64 5.86 
Bohai -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.93 2.93 4.77 3.64 3.64 3.85 4.59 
Capital -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.34 3.77 3.77 1.43 -- 
CCAMC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.93 1.93 1.93 -- 1.97 1.97 1.97 -- 
CEDTIC -- -- -- 2.67 5.33 7.74 7.19 4.52 2.11 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Central China -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.27 
CGWAMC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.48 2.48 2.48 -- -- -- -- 
CHAMC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.89 3.94 6.42 4.54 2.48 -- -- -- -- 
Changjiang -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.75 5.08 6.99 6.09 6.91 4.99 3.14 -- -- -- 2.18 
Changjiang BNP Paribas Peregrine  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.56 2.56 4.24 1.68 1.68 -- -- 
Chengdu 5.62 2.81 1.87 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
China -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.80 4.35 4.35 5.31 5.61 
China Cinda Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- 2.13 4.28 7.12 4.99 2.84 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
China Communication -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.14 4.94 7.53 7.46 4.66 2.07 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
China Dragon -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.35 2.35 2.35 1.46 1.46 3.32 3.48 5.68 
China Education Sci.-Tech. Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- 2.23 2.23 4.36 2.13 2.13 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
China Euro -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3.14 3.14 3.14 -- -- 1.94 1.94 
China Galaxy -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.24 2.24 4.25 4.86 7.84 8.51 8.77 8.88 9.33 8.42 8.46 
China Huarong Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.08 2.08 2.08 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
China Merchants -- -- 2.34 4.70 7.29 7.10 4.75 2.15 -- 2.27 4.68 7.38 7.65 7.56 6.82 6.58 6.87 7.95 
China Minzu -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.48 3.20 3.20 3.96 
China Minzu Intl. & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- 1.75 1.75 4.26 2.52 2.52 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
China Orient Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- 2.34 2.34 5.24 4.99 4.99 2.09 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
China People’s Insurance Trust & Investment Corp. -- 3.55 2.37 4.43 2.06 2.06 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
China Sci.-Tech. Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- 2.02 2.02 4.21 4.44 4.44 2.26 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Chung Mei Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- 2.27 2.27 4.82 2.55 2.55 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
CICC -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.36 5.62 8.95 9.92 9.46 6.13 6.13 6.67 10.00 9.93 9.93 9.93 
Cinda -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.79 2.79 4.87 4.40 
CITIC -- -- -- 2.65 5.98 9.13 9.56 9.41 9.19 8.65 8.80 8.77 9.04 8.84 9.13 9.66 9.49 9.62 
CITIC Wantong  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.39 2.39 4.44 2.05 2.05 -- -- 
Continued 
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Appendix I (Continued) 
IB 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Panel A: Main proxy for IB reputation (IBRMAIN) 
CJIS -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.60 3.93 6.02 7.33 
Credit Suisse Founder -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.29 
Dalian -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.06 2.06 2.06 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Dapeng -- -- -- 2.21 4.86 7.10 7.49 7.40 7.93 7.40 7.16 4.40 2.33 -- -- -- -- -- 
Daton -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.31 2.31 2.31 -- -- -- -- 
Dongguan -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.43 
Donghai -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.72 3.28 4.85 4.79 5.55 
Dongxing -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.70 1.70 
DSSC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.70 
Essence -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.64 1.64 4.67 4.89 7.83 
Everbright 5.47 2.73 1.82 2.38 5.14 8.00 8.56 8.56 8.10 7.23 6.93 7.62 5.56 4.80 3.82 5.90 6.54 7.18 
First Capital -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.79 4.45 
Fortune -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.54 3.18 3.18 1.64 -- 
Fortune CLSA -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.56 
Foshan -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.87 2.87 4.91 4.11 4.11 2.08 -- 
Foshan Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. 6.51 3.26 2.17 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Founder -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.64 1.64 1.64 -- 
Fujian Huaxing Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- 2.11 4.52 4.52 2.41 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Ganshu Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- 1.87 3.93 6.27 4.40 4.56 2.21 2.21 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Gansu -- -- -- -- 2.25 2.25 2.25 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Golden Sun -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.73 2.73 2.73 -- -- -- 1.87 
Goldman Sachs -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.75 2.75 5.50 2.75 
Goldstate -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.77 3.66 5.61 
Great Wall -- -- -- -- 2.22 4.91 4.91 4.93 4.62 6.56 6.31 7.27 5.33 3.33 -- -- -- -- 
Guangdong -- 3.43 2.29 4.60 5.18 7.57 5.26 5.08 5.12 7.06 6.37 6.92 4.98 2.98 -- -- -- -- 
GF -- 4.20 5.52 8.61 8.79 8.92 8.82 9.03 9.02 8.70 7.72 8.05 8.07 8.35 7.45 7.46 7.41 8.16 
Guangxi Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.05 2.05 2.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Guangzhou 7.38 3.69 2.46 -- 2.48 4.61 4.61 2.13 -- -- 2.15 5.07 5.07 2.92 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.82 
Guizhou -- -- -- -- 1.92 1.92 1.92 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Guodu -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.08 4.02 
Guolian -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.10 3.87 3.87 
Guosen -- -- -- -- -- 2.92 5.92 9.06 8.89 8.06 6.85 7.19 5.02 5.58 4.97 7.66 7.91 8.62 
Guotai 9.59 4.80 6.43 6.57 9.88 9.97 9.72 6.41 3.08 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Guotai Junan -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.85 6.13 9.36 9.03 8.65 8.55 6.03 6.35 5.37 7.87 4.65 5.57 
Guoyuan -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.05 5.10 7.33 6.82 5.50 5.30 5.89 6.72 
Hainan -- 4.61 5.62 7.47 4.39 1.85 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Hainan HK Macau Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- 1.45 4.00 6.24 7.10 4.55 2.31 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Hainan Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- 2.11 2.11 4.55 2.44 2.44 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Haitong 8.45 8.44 8.44 8.43 8.63 8.36 8.88 9.11 9.13 8.17 7.00 7.43 5.06 5.18 4.84 7.19 7.38 7.84 
Hantang -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.81 2.81 2.81 -- -- -- -- 
Hebei -- -- -- 1.73 3.50 3.50 3.90 2.13 2.13 1.72 3.99 3.99 2.26 -- -- -- -- -- 
Heilongjiang -- -- -- 2.03 2.03 2.03 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Henan -- -- -- -- 1.95 1.95 1.95 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Continued 
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Appendix I (Continued) 
IB 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Panel A: Main proxy for IB reputation (IBRMAIN) 
Hengtai -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.96 1.96 1.96 -- -- 
Hongta -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.75 3.63 
Hongyuan -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.28 2.28 4.38 2.09 5.38 3.28 5.36 3.65 5.68 5.36 6.62 
HuaAn -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.94 4.19 6.87 4.93 2.67 -- -- -- -- 
Huafu 5.03 2.51 1.68 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Hualin -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.43 2.43 2.43 -- -- -- 2.38 
Huarong -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.18 
Huatai -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.85 4.74 7.15 6.76 7.51 7.31 6.86 6.45 6.66 6.97 7.38 
Huatai United -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.96 4.99 
Huaxia 8.25 9.12 8.47 8.77 8.35 8.69 8.70 8.71 8.99 8.39 8.15 8.21 5.75 3.07 -- -- -- -- 
Hubei 6.46 3.23 2.15 2.31 5.22 7.90 7.60 4.69 2.01 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Huizhou 5.91 2.96 1.97 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Hunan 6.85 3.43 2.28 1.93 1.93 4.27 2.34 2.34 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Hunan Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- 1.77 1.77 1.77 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Industrial -- -- -- 2.06 4.67 4.67 4.72 4.34 6.85 6.80 7.11 7.83 5.78 5.16 3.94 6.62 6.77 7.24 
Jiangmen Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. 6.43 6.83 4.55 2.41 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Jiangsu 7.83 7.68 5.12 5.28 5.05 7.27 6.92 4.64 2.42 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Jilin 5.84 2.92 1.95 -- -- 2.42 2.42 2.42 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Junan 7.80 3.90 4.62 5.00 8.12 9.18 9.31 6.19 3.11 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Jutian -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.73 2.73 2.73 -- -- -- -- 
Lanzhou Trust & Investment Corp. 6.11 3.06 2.04 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Liaoning -- -- -- 2.08 2.08 2.08 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Minfa -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.08 2.08 4.49 2.41 2.41 -- -- -- -- 
Minsheng -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.43 3.16 5.13 6.28 
Nanfang 7.54 7.64 8.41 8.93 9.44 8.99 8.91 9.15 9.35 9.02 8.58 8.81 8.92 6.04 2.73 -- -- -- 
Nanjing -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.24 2.24 2.24 2.26 3.90 5.69 
New Times -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.39 1.39 1.39 2.23 
Ningbo -- -- -- 2.02 2.02 4.05 2.03 2.03 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Ningxia -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.46 2.46 2.46 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Northeast -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.87 1.87 4.17 4.52 7.36 7.74 7.41 6.19 5.56 3.66 4.48 
Northwest -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.84 1.84 4.18 2.34 2.34 -- -- -- -- 
Orient -- -- -- -- -- 2.25 2.25 4.64 5.18 7.56 5.16 5.05 5.28 5.28 4.49 1.89 4.66 4.92 
Pacific -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.44 
PingAn -- -- -- 2.35 4.47 4.47 2.12 2.39 4.48 6.83 6.83 7.89 5.54 5.53 4.72 7.29 7.56 8.43 
Qilu -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.23 4.27 
Qingdao -- -- -- 1.85 1.85 1.85 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Rising -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.91 3.69 
Sealand -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.66 2.66 2.66 1.55 1.55 3.36 3.92 
Shaanxi -- -- -- -- 1.81 1.81 1.81 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Shandong 3.62 1.81 1.21 -- -- 2.35 5.06 7.60 5.25 2.54 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Shandong Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.51 2.51 2.51 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Shanghai Finance 5.72 2.86 1.91 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Shanghai Intl. 10.00 9.42 6.28 2.95 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Continued 
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Appendix I (Continued) 
IB 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Panel A: Main proxy for IB reputation (IBRMAIN) 
Shanghai Shenyin 9.57 9.37 9.58 9.44 6.38 3.04 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Shantou 6.32 3.16 2.11 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Shanxi -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.97 1.97 1.97 -- 
Shenyin & Wanguo -- -- -- 2.94 6.24 9.33 9.26 5.96 2.87 -- 2.18 5.05 5.05 5.74 2.87 5.16 4.44 6.97 
Shenzhen Intl. 5.76 2.88 1.92 2.03 5.01 5.01 2.98 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Shenzhen Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. 7.91 3.96 2.64 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Shenzhen SEZ 9.12 8.74 5.83 5.04 2.26 2.26 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Sichuan 3.62 5.14 3.42 2.22 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Sinolink -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.73 3.51 5.57 6.71 
Soochow -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.54 2.54 4.43 3.73 3.73 4.06 4.70 
South China -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.98 
Southwest -- -- -- -- 2.71 2.71 2.71 2.68 4.93 7.21 6.69 7.03 4.75 2.59 1.69 1.69 1.69 2.68 
Sun -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.92 4.29 6.68 4.77 2.39 -- -- -- -- 
Tebon -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.62 3.60 5.64 
Three Gorges -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.23 2.23 2.23 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Tianjin 5.98 2.99 3.86 1.86 1.86 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Tianjin Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. 5.99 2.99 2.00 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Tianjin Northern Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.11 2.11 2.11 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Tianjin Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.03 2.03 2.03 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Tiantong -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.98 4.23 6.24 7.44 5.20 3.18 -- -- -- -- 
Tianyi -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.06 4.01 6.33 6.54 4.60 2.27 -- -- -- 
UBS -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 3.12 5.49 7.16 6.74 
United -- -- -- -- -- 2.48 5.15 7.92 8.26 5.59 4.84 4.89 6.99 6.69 5.47 5.61 6.02 4.37 
V-Sun -- -- -- -- 1.80 3.86 3.86 2.06 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Wanlian -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.82 
West China -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.68 2.68 4.31 1.63 1.63 -- -- 
Western -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.86 4.59 4.59 2.73 -- -- 1.66 4.02 
Wuhan 7.00 3.50 2.33 2.18 2.18 2.18 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Wuxi -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.85 2.85 2.85 -- -- -- -- 
Xiamen 4.11 2.06 1.37 1.76 3.69 5.87 6.03 4.10 1.92 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Xiamen Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.40 2.40 2.40 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Xiamen Jianfa Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.95 1.95 1.95 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Xiangcai -- -- -- 1.83 4.19 6.82 7.44 7.87 5.24 5.09 4.79 7.60 5.31 2.81 -- -- -- -- 
Xinjiang -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.33 2.33 2.33 -- -- -- -- -- 
Xinjiang Hong Yuan Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- 1.75 1.75 3.88 2.14 2.14 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Yellow River -- -- -- -- 2.17 2.17 2.17 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Yunnan 6.45 3.22 2.15 -- 1.53 1.53 1.53 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Zhejiang 6.73 7.08 4.72 4.39 1.91 4.33 2.41 4.56 2.15 2.15 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Zhejiang Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- -- 2.35 4.59 6.71 4.37 2.12 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Zheshang -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.87 
Zhongde -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.02 4.58 
Zhongxing Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- 2.25 2.25 2.25 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Zhuhai 6.89 3.44 2.30 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Continued 
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Appendix I (Continued) 
IB 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Panel B: Alternative proxy for IB reputation (IBRALT) 
AJ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- -- 
Anhui -- -- -- 0.67 1.67 2.00 1.33 1.33 1.00 1.00 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Anhui Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. 1.00 0.50 0.33 0.67 1.00 2.00 1.33 1.00 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Anhui Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Beijing -- 0.50 0.33 0.67 1.33 1.67 2.33 1.33 1.00 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.33 -- -- 
Beijing Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
BOCI -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.50 0.83 0.83 0.67 1.17 1.33 1.00 1.83 
Bohai -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.67 0.67 1.00 0.67 0.67 0.67 1.33 
Capital -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.33 -- 
CCAMC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- 0.67 0.67 0.67 -- 
CEDTIC -- -- -- 2.67 4.00 4.67 2.33 1.00 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Central China -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.67 
CGWAMC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- 
CHAMC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.67 1.00 0.67 0.33 -- -- -- -- 
Changjiang -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.67 2.33 2.67 1.33 1.33 1.00 0.67 -- -- -- 0.67 
Changjiang BNP Paribas Peregrine  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.67 0.67 1.33 0.67 0.67 -- -- 
Chengdu 2.00 1.00 0.67 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
China -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 1.50 1.50 2.83 4.67 
China Cinda Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- 0.67 1.00 1.33 0.67 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
China Communication -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 1.67 2.33 2.33 1.00 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
China Dragon -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.67 1.33 
China Education Sci.-Tech. Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
China Euro -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.33 1.33 1.33 -- -- 0.33 0.33 
China Galaxy -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.67 1.00 1.67 1.67 2.28 2.00 2.17 1.22 1.92 
China Huarong Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
China Merchants -- -- 0.33 1.33 2.67 3.00 2.00 0.67 -- 0.67 1.33 1.67 1.33 1.67 2.33 3.33 5.00 10.67 
China Minzu -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.67 0.67 1.33 
China Minzu Intl. & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
China Orient Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- 0.67 0.67 1.33 1.00 1.00 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
China People’s Insurance Trust & Investment Corp. -- 1.00 0.67 1.33 0.67 0.67 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
China Sci.-Tech. Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.67 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Chung Mei Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
CICC -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.67 1.00 1.67 2.00 1.67 1.00 1.36 3.08 3.25 3.22 2.92 
Cinda -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.11 0.11 0.44 1.33 
CITIC -- -- -- 1.33 6.00 7.33 8.33 8.00 9.33 8.00 4.67 2.67 2.33 2.53 4.14 4.81 5.28 7.75 
CITIC Wantong  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.67 0.67 -- -- 
CJIS -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.67 1.00 3.67 
Credit Suisse Founder -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.67 
Dalian -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Dapeng -- -- -- 1.00 2.67 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.33 2.33 1.00 0.67 -- -- -- -- -- 
Daton -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- 
Dongguan -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.00 
Donghai -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.67 1.00 1.00 2.00 
Continued 
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Panel B: Alternative proxy for IB reputation (IBRALT) 
Dongxing -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 
DSSC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 
Essence -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 1.00 1.00 4.33 
Everbright 2.00 1.00 0.67 1.00 2.67 3.33 3.33 3.33 3.33 3.00 2.33 2.67 2.00 1.33 2.67 3.00 4.33 4.67 
First Capital -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 1.67 
Fortune -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.33 -- 
Fortune CLSA -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.00 
Foshan -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 1.00 1.67 1.67 1.00 -- 
Foshan Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. 1.00 0.50 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Founder -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.67 0.67 0.67 -- 
Fujian Huaxing Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- 0.67 1.33 1.33 0.67 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Ganshu Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- 0.33 0.67 1.00 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Gansu -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Golden Sun -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.67 0.67 0.67 -- -- -- 0.33 
Goldman Sachs -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.44 0.44 0.78 0.33 
Goldstate -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.67 1.00 
Great Wall -- -- -- -- 0.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.00 1.67 1.67 2.00 1.33 1.00 -- -- -- -- 
Guangdong -- 0.50 0.33 1.33 3.00 3.67 2.67 2.00 2.33 3.00 2.00 2.00 1.33 1.00 -- -- -- -- 
GF -- 1.00 1.00 5.00 8.33 10.33 8.67 7.67 6.67 6.33 4.00 3.67 2.00 3.00 4.67 7.67 7.33 11.67 
Guangxi Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Guangzhou 3.00 1.50 1.00 -- 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.33 -- -- 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Guizhou -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Guodu -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.67 1.00 
Guolian -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.67 0.67 
Guosen -- -- -- -- -- 2.67 4.00 8.00 6.00 5.33 1.67 2.33 1.67 3.33 7.33 10.33 12.67 18.00 
Guotai 3.00 1.50 2.00 8.67 14.67 18.00 12.33 6.33 2.00 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Guotai Junan -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.67 4.67 8.00 8.33 5.67 2.67 1.67 1.08 1.08 1.75 1.00 1.75 
Guoyuan -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 1.33 1.67 1.67 1.33 1.67 2.67 4.00 
Hainan -- 2.00 1.67 2.00 0.67 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Hainan HK Macau Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- 0.33 1.67 2.33 2.33 1.00 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Hainan Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.67 0.67 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Haitong 9.00 5.00 3.67 3.67 4.67 4.67 4.33 5.33 5.67 4.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.67 3.11 4.78 5.44 7.33 
Hantang -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.67 0.67 0.67 -- -- -- -- 
Hebei -- -- -- 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.33 1.00 1.00 0.67 -- -- -- -- -- 
Heilongjiang -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Henan -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Hengtai -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.67 0.67 0.67 -- -- 
Hongta -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.67 
Hongyuan -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.33 1.67 1.33 2.33 1.33 2.00 1.33 4.00 
HuaAn -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.67 1.33 2.00 1.33 0.67 -- -- -- -- 
Huafu 1.00 0.50 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Hualin -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- 1.00 
Huarong -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 
Continued 
 
 
37 
Appendix I (Continued) 
IB 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Panel B: Alternative proxy for IB reputation (IBRALT) 
Huatai -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.67 2.00 3.33 3.00 3.00 2.00 1.33 2.67 3.67 3.33 4.00 
Huatai United -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 8.00 
Huaxia 6.00 4.50 3.33 6.67 8.00 8.67 5.00 4.67 5.33 4.33 3.00 2.33 1.67 1.00 -- -- -- -- 
Hubei 2.00 1.00 0.67 1.00 3.00 4.33 3.67 1.67 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Huizhou 1.00 0.50 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Hunan 2.00 1.00 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Hunan Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Industrial -- -- -- 0.33 1.67 1.67 1.67 0.67 1.33 1.33 2.00 2.67 2.33 2.00 1.33 1.83 1.83 2.83 
Jiangmen Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Jiangsu 4.00 2.50 1.67 1.67 2.00 2.33 1.67 1.00 0.67 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Jilin 1.00 0.50 0.33 -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Junan 4.00 2.00 1.67 4.33 9.67 12.67 10.00 4.67 1.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Jutian -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.67 0.67 0.67 -- -- -- -- 
Lanzhou Trust & Investment Corp. 1.00 0.50 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Liaoning -- -- -- 0.67 0.67 0.67 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Minfa -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.67 0.67 1.00 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- 
Minsheng -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.67 1.00 3.00 
Nanfang 4.00 3.00 2.67 5.67 9.00 9.33 6.33 7.33 8.33 8.00 3.83 2.50 1.83 1.00 0.33 -- -- -- 
Nanjing -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.67 1.00 
New Times -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 1.00 
Ningbo -- -- -- 0.67 0.67 1.00 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Ningxia -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Northeast -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 1.33 1.67 2.33 2.00 1.67 1.67 1.67 1.33 2.33 
Northwest -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- 
Orient -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 1.00 1.33 2.00 1.33 1.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 1.67 1.67 
Pacific -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.33 
PingAn -- -- -- 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.67 1.33 2.67 2.67 3.33 2.00 3.67 6.00 8.67 10.67 19.67 
Qilu -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.67 1.00 
Qingdao -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Rising -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.67 
Sealand -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.67 1.00 
Shandong 1.00 0.50 0.33 -- -- 0.67 1.33 1.67 1.00 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Shandong Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Shanghai Finance 1.00 0.50 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Shanghai Intl. 18.00 10.50 7.00 1.00 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Shanghai Shenyin 18.00 11.50 8.33 6.33 4.67 4.00 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Shannxi -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Shantou 1.00 0.50 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Shanxi -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.00 1.00 1.00 -- 
Shenyin & Wanguo -- -- -- 3.67 10.33 12.33 10.00 3.33 1.33 -- 0.67 1.67 1.67 1.42 0.42 1.08 1.67 3.00 
Shenzhen Intl. 1.00 0.50 0.33 0.33 2.67 2.67 2.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Shenzhen Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. 4.00 2.00 1.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Shenzhen SEZ 12.00 7.00 4.67 1.33 0.67 0.67 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Continued 
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Sichuan 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Sinolink -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.67 1.00 2.00 4.33 
Soochow -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 1.00 1.67 1.67 2.00 2.33 
South China -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 
Southwest -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.67 1.00 1.33 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.67 2.33 
Sun -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 1.33 1.67 1.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- 
Tebon -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.67 1.00 
Three Gorges -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Tianjin 1.00 0.50 0.67 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Tianjin Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. 1.00 0.50 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Tianjin Northern Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Tianjin Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Tiantong -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 1.33 1.67 2.67 1.67 1.33 -- -- -- -- 
Tianyi -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.33 -- -- -- 
UBS -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.94 1.28 1.61 1.33 
United -- -- -- -- -- 0.67 1.33 3.00 4.00 3.33 2.00 1.00 1.33 1.33 1.00 1.67 2.00 1.67 
V-Sun -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Wanlian -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 
West China -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.33 -- -- 
Western -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.33 -- -- 0.33 1.33 
Wuhan 3.00 1.50 1.00 0.67 0.67 0.67 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Wuxi -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.67 0.67 0.67 -- -- -- -- 
Xiamen 1.00 0.50 0.33 0.33 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Xiamen Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Xiamen Jianfa Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Xiangcai -- -- -- 0.33 1.00 2.00 2.33 3.33 2.33 2.67 1.67 2.00 1.00 0.33 -- -- -- -- 
Xinjiang -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.67 0.67 0.67 -- -- -- -- -- 
Xinjiang Hong Yuan Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Yellow River -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Yunnan 2.00 1.00 0.67 -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Zhejiang 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Zhejiang Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.67 1.00 0.67 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Zheshang -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.33 
Zhongde -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.67 2.67 
Zhongxing Trust & Investment Corp. -- -- -- -- 0.33 0.33 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Zhuhai 2.00 1.00 0.67 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
BOCI = Bank of China International; CCAMC = China Cinda Asset Management Corporation; CEDTIC = China Economic Development Trust & Investment Corporation; CGWAMC = China Great 
Wall Asset Management Corporation; CHAMC = China Huarong Asset Management Corporation; CICC = China International Capital Corporation; CITIC = China International Trust & Investment 
Corporation; CJIS = China Jianyin Investment Securities; DSSC = Daiwa SSC Securities; Fortune CLSA = Fortune Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia Securities; GF = Guangfa Securities; UBS = Union 
Bank of Switzerland; Shenzhen SEZ = Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Securities. 
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IB Merged and acquired IBs and the resulting IB 
AVIC Jiangxi South China Trust & Investment Corp. + Bridge Trust & Investment Corp. → South China Securities → 
Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) Securities. 
BOCI Hainan HK Macau Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. → HK & Macau Securities; HK & Macau Securities + Bank of China 
Intl. (BOCI) → BOCI. 
Bohai Tianjin Securities + Tianjin Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. + Tianjin Northern Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. + Tianjin 
Trust & Investment Corp. → Bohai Securities. 
Caida Heibei Caida Securities + Jiamusi Securities + Heibei Securities → Heibei Caida Securities → Caida Securities. 
Central China  Henan Securities → Central China Securities. 
Changjiang China Education Sci.-Tech. Trust & Investment Corp. + Hubei Securities → Hubei Securities → Changjiang Securities; 
Dapeng Securities + Changjiang Securities → Changjiang Securities; 
Changjiang Securities + BNP Paribas → Changjiang BNP Paribas Peregrine Securities → Changjiang Securities. 
China Huaxia Securities → China Securities. 
China Dragon Ganshu Trust & Investment Corp. + Lanzhou Trust & Investment Corp. → China Dragon Securities. 
China Galaxy  China Huarong Trust & Investment Corp. + China Orient Trust & Investment Corp. + China People’s Insurance Trust 
& Investment Corp. + China Cinda Trust & Investment Corp. + China Great Wall Trust & Investment Corp. → China 
Galaxy Securities; 
China Economic Development Trust & Investment Corp. + China Galaxy Securities → China Galaxy Securities. 
China Investment Nanfang Securities → China Jianyin Investment Securities (CJIS) → China Investment Securities. 
China Merchants  China Communication Securities → China Merchants Securities; 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Securities → Jutian Securities; Jutian Securities + China Merchants Securities 
→ China Merchants Securities. 
China Minzu China Minzu Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. + Anshan Securities + Leshan Trust & Investment Corp. → China Minzu 
Securities. 
Chinalion Jiangmen Securities → Hualin Securities → Chinalion Securities. 
Cinda Guizhou Securities + Zhanjiang Securities → Hantang Securities; Hantang Securities + Liaoning Securities + China Cinda 
Asset Management Corp. (CCAMC) → Cinda Securities. 
CITIC Wantong Qingdao Securities + China Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. (CITIC) → CITIC Wantong Securities. 
Daton Dalian Securities → Daton Securities. 
Donghai Changzhou Securities → Donghai Securities; Zhongxing Trust & Investment Corp. + Donghai Securities → Donghai 
Securities. 
Dongxing Minfa Securities → Dongxing Securities. 
Essence  China Sci.-Tech. Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. → China Sci.-Tech. Securities → Essence Securities; 
Shantou Securities → Zhongguancun Securities; Zhongguancun Securities + Guangdong Securities + Essence Securities 
→ Essence Securities. 
Everbright Ningbo Securities → Tianyi Securities; Tianyi Securities + Everbright Securities → Everbright Securities. 
First Capital  Foshan Securities → First Capital Securities. 
Fortune China Euro Securities → Fortune Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) Securities → Fortune Securities; 
Hunan Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. + Hunan Trust & Investment Corp. → Fortune Securities. 
Founder  Zhejiang Securities → Founder Securities; 
Hunan Securities → Sun Securities; Sun Securities + Founder Securities → Founder Securities. 
GF Zhuhai Securities → First Securities; First Securities + Wuhan Securities + Guangfa (GF) Securities → GF Securities; 
Goldman Sachs Goldman Sachs + Gao Hua Securities → Goldman Sachs Gao Hua Securities (Goldman Sachs). 
Goldstate Hainan Securities → Goldstate Securities; 
Hainan Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. + Haikou Trust & Investment Corp. → Goldstate Securities. 
Great Wall China Great Wall Asset Management Corp. (CGWAMC) → Great Wall Securities. 
Guodu Beijing Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. + Chung Mei Trust & Investment Corp. → Guodu Securities. 
Guolian Wuxi Securities → Guolian Securities. 
Guotai Junan Guotai Securities + Junan Securities → Guotai Junan Securities. 
Guoyuan Anhui Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. + Anhui Trust & Investment Corp. → Guoyuan Securities. 
Haitong Heilongjiang Securities → Xing’an Securities; Xing’an Securities + Gansu Securities + Haitong Securities → Haitong 
Securities. 
Hengtai Inner Mongolia Securities → Hengtai Securities. 
Hongyuan Xinjiang Hong Yuan Trust & Investment Corp. → Hongyuan Securities; 
Xinjiang Securities + Hongyuan Securities → Hongyuan Securities. 
HuaAn Anhui Securities → HuaAn Securities. 
Huafu Fujian Huaxing Trust & Investment Corp. + Jiangmen Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. → Huafu Securities; 
Huafu Securities → GF Huafu Securities → Huafu Securities. 
Huarong China Huarong Asset Management Corp. (CHAMC) → Huarong Securities. 
Huatai Jiangsu Securities → Huatai Securities; 
Three Gorges Securities → Asia Securities; Asia Securities + Huatai Securities → Huatai Securities. 
Huatai United United Securities → Huatai United Securities. 
Huaxi Sichuan Securities → West China Securities → Huaxi Securities. 
Lianxun Huizhou Securities → Lianxun Securities. 
Minsheng Zhengzhou Securities → Yellow River Securities → Minsheng Securities. 
Nanjing  Ningxia Securities → Northwest Securities; Northwest Securities + Nanjing Securities → Nanjing Securities. 
Northeast  Jilin Securities → Northeast Securities. 
Pacific  Yunnan Securities → Pacific Securities. 
Qilu Xiamen Jianfa Trust & Investment Corp. + Xiamen Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. + Shandong Intl. Trust & Investment 
Corp. → Qilu Securities; 
Shandong Securities → Tiantong Securities; Tiantong Securities + Qilu Securities → Qilu Securities. 
Sealand Guangxi Trust & Investment Corp. → Guangxi Securities → Sealand Securities. 
Continued 
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Shanghai  Shanghai Finance Securities + Shanghai Intl. Trust & Investment Corp. → Shanghai Securities. 
Shenyin & Wanguo Shanghai Intl. Securities + Shanghai Shenyin Securities → Shenyin & Wanguo Securities. 
Sinolink Chengdu Securities → Sinolink Securities. 
Soochow  Suzhou Securities → Soochow Securities. 
Southwest  Chongqing Securities → Southwest Securities. 
UBS  Beijing Securities + Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) → UBS. 
Western  Shannxi Securities + Baoji Securities → Western Securities. 
Yingda V-Sun Securities → Yingda Securities. 
This appendix presents a list of major takeovers of Chinese IBs occurring over the period 1993 to 2010. 
 
 
Appendix III: Reference Portfolio Benchmark 
In this study, each IPO firm is matched to one reference portfolio based on the existing listed firms classified 
with similar size and B/M as well as within the same industry category. Specifically, at the end of the 
calendar year before the IPO, all the stocks listed on the SHSE and SZSE are sorted into three size (value) 
portfolios: Low, Medium, or High, according to whether their market value (B/M) are included in the lowest 
30, middle 40, or highest 30 percentile, respectively. The size of the IPO firm is measured as the market 
capitalization of its common equity (the product of the number of shares outstanding and the first trading 
day closing price), while B/M for the IPO firm is calculated using the first recorded post-issue book value 
divided by the market capitalization on the first trading day. In addition, we assign each IPO firm to one of 
14 industry portfolios, according to the two-digit ICB codes. Then each IPO firm in our sample will match 
with one of 126 (9 × 14) reference portfolios to control for the size and value effects as well as the industry 
effect. 
  Whole market   SHSE  SZSE 
Industry 
Two-digit ICB codes   
Supersector 
Gross 
proceeds 
N  
Gross 
proceeds 
N  
Gross 
proceeds 
N 
0 Oil & Gas  05 Oil & Gas 99,804.40 28  83,836.22 8  15,968.18 20 
1 Basic Materials  13 Chemicals 84,621.25 181  27,965.48 66  56,655.77 115 
 17 Basic Resources 219,311.65 170  175,485.78 91  43,825.87 79 
2 Industrials  23 Construction & Materials 156,227.53 112  126,041.73 45  30,185.80 67 
 27 Industrial Goods & Services 333,247.83 453  189,608.50 161  143,639.33 292 
3 Consumer Goods  33 Automobiles & Parts 36,118.00 69  17,230.50 31  18,887.50 38 
 35 Food & Beverage 60,504.50 121  27,152.89 53  33,351.61 68 
 37 Personal & Household Goods 71,336.93 149  23,101.52 53  48,235.41 96 
4 Health Care  45 Health Care 70,169.89 140  22,480.15 60  47,689.74 80 
5 Consumer Services  53 Retail 23,902.55 63  10,634.77 34  13,267.78 29 
 55 Media 14,230.83 20  6,320.78 7  7,910.05 13 
 57 Travel & Leisure 34,489.24 39  27,917.30 19  6,571.94 20 
7 Utilities  75 Utilities 48,203.48 64  38,301.22 40  9,902.26 24 
9 Technology  95 Technology 69,770.57 140  14,946.77 39  54,823.80 101 
Full sample  1,321,938.65 1,749  791,023.61 707  530,915.04 1,042 
This appendix presents the distribution of the sample of 1,749 IPOs over the period 1993 to 2010 by the industry category, 
according to the two-digit ICB codes (see full details and description of the ICB at: http://www.icbenchmark.com), in terms of the 
raised aggregate gross proceeds and the total number of IPOs. The gross proceeds are presented in millions of RMB, adjusted 
using CPI (2005 = 100). RMB 1.00 was approximately USD 0.1239 on December 31, 2005. The whole sample consists of 786 
IPOs issued during the pre-reform period and 963 IPOs issued during the post-reform period. 
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Appendix IV: Definitions of All Variables 
BHAR36 represents the equal-weighted reference portfolio-adjusted three-year BHAR of IPOs. The 
reference portfolio benchmark is based on the existing listed firms classified with similar size and B/M as 
well as within the same industry category, according to the two-digit ICB codes (see Appendix II). 
LNBHAR36 represents the natural logarithm of 1,000% plus BHAR36. 
IBRMAIN represents the three-year moving average (t –3, t –2, t –1) of the aggregate gross proceeds raised 
by each IB in each calendar year t, over the sample period. The gross proceeds are presented in millions of 
RMB, adjusted using CPI (2005 = 100). 
IBRALT represents the three-year moving average (t –3, t –2, t –1) of the total number of IPOs managed, by 
each IB in each calendar year t, over the sample period. 
IR represents the market-adjusted initial return of each IPO, which is computed as the percentage difference 
between the offering price and the first trading day closing price, relative to corresponding return on the 
SHSE or SZSE A-Share Index for IPOs on the SHSE or SZSE, respectively. 
LAG represents the number of days between the offering and listing dates. LNLAG represents the natural 
logarithm of LAG. 
AGE represents the number of years since the founding year of the IPO firm as of the offering date. LN(AGE 
+1) represents the natural logarithm of 1 plus AGE. 
SIZE represents the raised aggregate gross proceeds of the IPO in millions of RMB, adjusted using CPI 
(2005 = 100). LNSZIE represents the natural logarithm of SIZE. 
STATE represents the fraction of state-owned shares by total shares outstanding of the IPO firm. 
MARKET represents the overall market performance prior to the offering, which is computed as the 
weighted average buy-and-hold return of the corresponding market index in three months prior to offering. 
The SHSE and SZSE A-Share Indices provide the benchmark for IPOs on the SHSE and SZSE, 
respectively. The weights are 3 for the most recent month, 2 for the next, and 1 for the third month prior to 
offering (Derrien & Womack, 2003). 
 
